Staub v. City of Baxley
2 L. Ed. 2d 302, 78 S. Ct. 277 (1958)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal ordinance that requires a permit to solicit members for an organization is an unconstitutional prior restraint on First Amendment freedoms when it grants officials unfettered discretion to grant or deny the permit without objective, definite standards.
Facts:
- Rose Staub was a salaried employee and organizer for the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.
- The union was attempting to organize employees of a manufacturing company, and several of these employees lived in the City of Baxley, Georgia.
- The City of Baxley had an ordinance requiring any person soliciting members for an organization that collected dues to first obtain a permit from the Mayor and Council.
- The ordinance granted the Mayor and Council discretion to deny a permit based on their subjective consideration of the applicant's character and the organization's effects on the general welfare.
- On February 19, 1954, without applying for a permit, Staub met with several employees in their homes and at a small gathering in Baxley to talk to them about joining the union.
- Staub explained the benefits of the union and offered blank membership cards, but did not ask for or receive any money.
Procedural Posture:
- Rose Staub was charged and convicted of violating a city ordinance in the Mayor’s Court of the City of Baxley.
- Her motion to abate the action, which argued the ordinance was unconstitutional, was overruled by the Mayor's Court.
- The Superior Court of the county, a state trial court, affirmed the conviction.
- Staub appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, ruling that Staub lacked standing to challenge the ordinance because she did not apply for a permit and failed to attack specific sections of the ordinance.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia, the state's highest court, denied Staub's application for certiorari.
- Staub then appealed the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance that makes the exercise of free speech contingent upon obtaining a permit from city officials, who have absolute discretion to grant or deny the permit based on their assessment of the applicant and the organization, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Whittaker
Yes. An ordinance which makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. The Baxley ordinance is invalid on its face because it makes the enjoyment of freedom of speech contingent upon the will of the Mayor and Council, who are given uncontrolled discretion to grant or refuse a permit. The criteria for their decision—'the character of the applicant, the nature of the...organization...and its effects upon the general welfare'—are without any definite standards. Citing precedents like Lovell v. Griffin and Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court affirmed that such a scheme is a forbidden burden on liberty. The Court also rejected the state court's procedural grounds for dismissal, holding that failure to apply for a license under a facially unconstitutional ordinance does not prevent a defendant from challenging it, and that a state's procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the assertion of a federal right.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No, the Court should not have reached the constitutional merits of the case. The appeal should be dismissed because the Georgia Court of Appeals' decision rested on an adequate and independent state procedural ground. The state court dismissed Staub's challenge because she failed to comply with a Georgia procedural rule requiring a challenger to attack specific sections of a law, not the law as a whole. This is a reasonable rule of practice that does not discriminate against federal claims and is designed to narrow constitutional litigation. By overriding this valid state procedure, the majority fails to show due regard for the federal system and the independence of state judiciaries.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark decision in First Amendment prior restraint doctrine. It solidifies the principle that a licensing or permit scheme regulating speech is unconstitutional on its face if it vests government officials with unbridled discretion. The ruling confirms that an individual does not have to apply for a permit under such a scheme to have standing to challenge its constitutionality. This precedent significantly curtails the ability of municipalities to use vague permit laws to suppress disfavored speech, such as labor organizing, and provides a strong basis for facial challenges to such laws.
