State v. Workman
584 P.2d 382, 90 Wash. 2d 443, 1978 Wash. LEXIS 1106 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
Once a defendant has taken a substantial step that is strongly corroborative of their criminal purpose, the crime of attempt is complete and cannot be undone by a subsequent abandonment of that purpose.
Facts:
- After a night of drinking, Lawrence Dean Workman and Steven Lynn Hughes decided to rob a gas station in Spokane.
- They parked behind the Fill-em' Fast Gas Station, retrieved a loaded .22 caliber rifle, a gunny sack, and a stocking cap from the car's trunk to use as masks.
- They walked to a fence behind the station and waited for approximately 15 minutes before moving to a hiding place directly behind the station's pay booth.
- The station attendant, having seen the unmasked men behind the booth, called the police.
- Workman then approached the attendant's window without the gun and asked for a cigarette but was refused.
- After this, Workman and Hughes decided not to proceed with the robbery and began walking away from the station.
- As they were leaving, police stopped and arrested them in the alley.
- A search revealed that Hughes had the sawed-off rifle concealed under his clothing.
Procedural Posture:
- Lawrence Workman and Steven Hughes were separately charged with attempted first-degree robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.
- Following separate trials in the trial court, juries found both defendants guilty.
- The juries also returned special verdicts finding that both defendants had been armed with a deadly weapon that was also a firearm.
- After the verdicts, the trial judges in both cases entered orders granting the defendants new trials.
- In defendant Hughes's case, the judge also vacated the jury's special findings.
- The State of Washington, as appellant, appealed the orders granting new trials to the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Is a defendant entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of abandonment to a charge of criminal attempt once the defendant has taken a substantial step toward the commission of the crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Horowitz, J.
No. A defendant is not entitled to an instruction on abandonment once a substantial step toward the commission of the crime has been taken, because the crime of attempt is already complete at that point. The Washington attempt statute requires intent to commit a crime and an act which is a "substantial step" toward its commission. The court adopts the Model Penal Code's standard, defining a "substantial step" as conduct that is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. The court reasoned that abandonment is not a true affirmative defense that negates a substantial step once it has occurred; rather, a defendant's decision to walk away is only relevant to argue that their prior actions did not yet amount to a substantial step. Because the defendants' proposed instruction incorrectly implied that abandonment could be a defense even after a substantial step was taken, the trial courts did not err in refusing it. The court also held that unlawfully carrying a weapon is a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree robbery and the failure to provide a jury instruction on it was an error justifying a new trial. Finally, the court ruled that a general sentence enhancement statute for using a firearm cannot be applied on top of a first-degree robbery conviction, as the specific robbery statute already accounts for the use of a weapon.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying Washington's law on criminal attempt by formally adopting the Model Penal Code's "substantial step" test. This moves the analysis away from proximity to completion and towards an examination of acts that objectively demonstrate criminal intent. By rejecting abandonment as an affirmative defense after a substantial step is taken, the decision solidifies the point at which criminal liability attaches for an attempt. The ruling also impacts sentencing by preventing the 'stacking' of a general firearm enhancement onto a specific crime that already includes use of a weapon as an element, thereby upholding the rule of lenity in statutory interpretation.
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