State v. Wilson
346 P.2d 115, 79 A.L.R. 2d 587, 218 Or. 575 (1959)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The crime of attempted assault is a legally cognizable offense under a general attempt statute, even where assault is defined as an attempted battery. Conduct that proceeds beyond mere preparation toward an assault, but falls short of the actor possessing the 'present ability' to inflict injury required for a completed assault, can be punished as an attempt.
Facts:
- Harvey Raymond Wilson and his wife, Frances Ora Wilson, were separated.
- Several days before the main incident, Wilson went to the laundry room where Frances worked, called her names, and threatened her by saying, 'I’ll give you just twenty-four hours to live.'
- On September 12, 1957, Wilson returned to the laundry room and told his wife, 'This is it.'
- When Frances ran to an office to call the police, Wilson followed, tore the phone from the wall, and threw it at her.
- Wilson then went to his car, retrieved a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, and returned to the hotel.
- As Wilson walked down a hallway with the shotgun, Frances started to exit an office; a co-worker, Grace Scebeta, saw Wilson and pulled Frances back into the office, shutting and securing the door.
- Wilson then entered the laundry room, confronted two other employees, Vivian Smith and Helen Robbins, pointed the shotgun at them, and said, 'Don’t move anyone or I’ll shoot you.'
- Wilson turned and was leaving the building when he was apprehended by police.
Procedural Posture:
- Harvey Raymond Wilson was charged by indictment in the circuit court for Multnomah county, a trial court.
- The indictment contained two counts: Count I for attempted assault with a dangerous weapon against Frances Ora Wilson, and Count II for assault with a dangerous weapon against Vivian Smith.
- The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.
- The trial court entered a judgment of conviction against Wilson based on the jury's verdict.
- Wilson (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Oregon.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the crime of attempted assault with a dangerous weapon exist under Oregon law, or is it a logical absurdity as an 'attempt to attempt' a crime?
Opinions:
Majority - O’Connell, J.
Yes, the crime of attempted assault with a dangerous weapon exists under Oregon law. The defendant's argument that an attempted assault is a nonsensical 'attempt to attempt' is unpersuasive. The court provides two main rationales. First, criminal assault can be viewed as a distinct substantive crime, not merely an attempted battery, making it a valid object of a criminal attempt. Second, even if assault is defined as an attempted battery that requires 'present ability' to cause injury, the law can still recognize and punish conduct that has advanced beyond mere preparation but falls short of that present ability. The court adopts the pragmatic view that the law should punish dangerous conduct that is a substantial step toward a crime, rather than getting caught in 'barren logical construction.' Wilson's act of arming himself and returning to the building to find his wife, only to be stopped by a locked door, constituted acts that went far beyond mere preparation and were properly charged as an attempt.
Dissenting - McAllister, C. J.
No opinion provided in the text, only a note that the Chief Justice dissents.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies that the logical paradox of an 'attempt to attempt a crime' will not shield a defendant from liability for conduct that is clearly a substantial step toward committing a violent offense. By prioritizing a pragmatic approach over semantic formalism, the court expanded the reach of the general attempt statute to cover inchoate crimes where the target offense is itself inchoate in nature (i.e., assault as an attempted battery). This ruling allows prosecutors to charge individuals who are thwarted just before they gain the 'present ability' to harm, closing a potential loophole and ensuring that dangerous, preparatory acts are punishable.
