State v. Williquette
129 Wis. 2d 239, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A parent who has a legal duty to protect their child and knowingly fails to prevent another person from abusing that child can be prosecuted for the direct commission of child abuse under a statute prohibiting one from "subjecting a child to cruel maltreatment."
Facts:
- Terri Williquette's husband, Bert Williquette, repeatedly physically and sexually abused her two children, seven-year-old B.W. and eight-year-old C.P.
- The abuse included beatings with a metal stick, being forced into stress positions, sexual assault, and being forced to eat feces.
- Both children told their mother, Terri Williquette, about the ongoing physical and sexual abuse on numerous occasions.
- After being told of the abuse, Terri Williquette took no action to prevent it from continuing.
- Williquette told her son B.W. "not to worry about it" after a beating and gave her daughter C.P. an ice pack after her head was struck with a metal stick.
- Despite her knowledge of the ongoing abuse, Terri Williquette continued to leave her children in the sole physical custody of Bert Williquette for hours at a time while she was at work.
Procedural Posture:
- Terri Williquette was charged with two counts of child abuse in a criminal complaint filed in Door County.
- After a preliminary hearing, the trial court ordered Williquette bound over for trial.
- Williquette filed a motion to dismiss the information, arguing the child abuse statute did not apply to her failure to act.
- The circuit court (trial court) granted the motion to dismiss the charges.
- The State appealed the dismissal to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
- The court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that Williquette could be prosecuted on a theory of aiding and abetting child abuse, but not for direct commission.
- The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Can a parent be prosecuted for the direct commission of child abuse under sec. 940.201, Stats., when they knowingly fail to take any action to prevent their spouse from repeatedly abusing their children, while continuing to leave the children in the spouse's sole care?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Steinmetz
Yes. A parent who knowingly permits another person to abuse the parent's own child subjects the child to abuse within the meaning of sec. 940.201. The court reasoned that the statutory language "subjects a child to cruel maltreatment" is broader than directly inflicting abuse. Citing dictionary definitions, the court found that "subjects" includes exposing a child to a foreseeable risk of harm. The court further held that while criminal liability is generally not based on an omission, an exception exists where there is a legal duty to act. The parent-child relationship creates such a legal duty to protect. Therefore, a parent's knowing failure to act in the face of foreseeable abuse, such as by continuing to leave the children in the care of a known abuser, is overt conduct that is a substantial factor in causing the harm and can be prosecuted as a direct violation of the child abuse statute.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Heffernan
No. The child abuse statute does not make criminal the failure of a parent to act to prevent abuse by another. The dissent argued that the statute, as applied to Williquette's conduct, is ambiguous and unconstitutionally vague, as it does not provide fair notice that an omission could be prosecuted as a felony. The majority's interpretation usurps the legislative prerogative to define criminal conduct, effectively creating an ex post facto law. A plain reading of the statute suggests it applies only to the person who actually inflicts the torture or cruel maltreatment. If the legislature had intended to criminalize a parent's failure to protect, it could have done so with clear and explicit language, as other states have done.
Concurring - Justice Bablitch
The statute does not allow the State to charge Williquette as a direct actor for child abuse. The concurring opinion agrees with the dissent that the statute's language requires a direct nexus between the actor and the injury, which is absent here since Williquette did not personally inflict the abuse. However, the author concluded that Williquette's alleged conduct—continuing to leave her children in her husband's care despite knowing of the abuse—could be found by a reasonable jury to constitute aiding and abetting the crime of child abuse. Therefore, while disagreeing with the majority's theory of direct liability, the justice concurred in the judgment to affirm the court of appeals and allow the prosecution to proceed on an aiding and abetting theory.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadened the scope of direct criminal liability for child abuse in Wisconsin, moving beyond just the person inflicting physical harm. It established that a parent's common law duty to protect their child from harm is an affirmative legal duty, the breach of which can be the basis for a felony conviction. This case solidifies the principle that passive enablement of abuse by a person with a special duty of care can be treated as a criminal act of commission, not merely an omission. This holding influences future prosecutions by allowing charges to be brought against parents who knowingly allow their children to remain in abusive situations, even if they never actively participate in the abuse itself.
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