State v. Williford
1981 Wisc. LEXIS 2788, 103 Wis. 2d 98, 307 N.W.2d 277 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A jury instruction for the lesser-included offense of manslaughter (heat of passion) is required only if there is a reasonable ground in the evidence for acquittal on the greater charge and for conviction on the lesser, based on provocation that would ordinarily overcome an ordinary person's judgment, occurring without a sufficient cooling-off period.
Facts:
- Lennon Williford and Annabelle, who had twin boys, married in 1976 after a long period of living together.
- Throughout their relationship, the couple had frequent, tumultuous disagreements involving mutual verbal abuse and physical violence, with Annabelle previously drawing a gun on Williford on two occasions (once firing it into a wall) and beating him with a stick.
- In September 1978, Annabelle filed for legal separation, citing Williford’s alcoholism and failure to provide support, and Williford later discovered she had a paramour, causing him to move out of their home.
- On November 4, 1978, Annabelle verbally insulted Williford while he was receiving a speeding ticket, leading him to chase, grab, push, and kick her until police intervened.
- Around that time, Williford called Annabelle and threatened to kill her, stating, “Listen here, you’re going to wind up — and I’m going to kill you.”
- On November 25, 1978, around 1 a.m., Williford went to Annabelle’s residence, where they drank and talked; he proposed reconciliation, but Annabelle rejected him, called him a “stupid old son-of-a-bitch,” and stated she was going to marry her new boyfriend.
- As Williford got up to leave, Annabelle allegedly pulled out a gun, exclaimed “I am going to blow your brains out,” and a struggle ensued during which Williford wrestled the gun from her.
- Williford then shot Annabelle at least four times, emptying the gun into her body, and continued to pull the trigger after all live rounds were discharged.
Procedural Posture:
- On November 28, 1978, a criminal complaint was filed in the circuit court for Racine County, charging Lennon Williford with the first-degree murder of Annabelle Williford.
- Following a jury trial, the circuit judge convicted Williford of first-degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment, after rejecting Williford's request to submit a verdict on manslaughter (heat of passion).
- Williford filed a post-conviction motion, arguing that the circuit court's failure to submit a verdict on manslaughter (heat of passion) constituted prejudicial error.
- The trial judge denied Williford's post-conviction motion, affirming his prior ruling.
- Williford appealed from the judgment of conviction and the order denying post-conviction relief to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment and order, finding that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury on manslaughter (heat of passion), and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.
- The State appealed the Court of Appeals' ruling to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in refusing to instruct the jury and submit a verdict on the lesser-included crime of manslaughter (heat of passion)?
Opinions:
Majority - COFFEY, J.
No, the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter (heat of passion) because the evidence, even when viewed most favorably to the defendant, did not reasonably support such an instruction. The court reiterated the standard for submitting lesser-included offenses, requiring a “reasonable ground in the evidence for acquittal on the greater charge and for conviction on the lesser charge” (Ross v. State, 1973; State v. Bergenthal, 1971). Manslaughter (heat of passion) requires both an objective and subjective component: the provocation must be "reasonable, adequate" to overcome an ordinary person's judgment, rendering them temporarily deaf to reason and acting uncontrollably, and it must actually produce such a mental disturbance in the defendant (Johnson v. State, 1906). The court found that the various provocative events in the couple's tumultuous relationship, ranging from four years to two weeks before the murder, were too remote, allowing for a “cooling off” period, and thus did not meet the objective test for an “ordinarily constituted person” (Muller v. State, 1980; Zenou v. State, 1958). Regarding the immediate altercation, the court characterized Annabelle's insults and gun threat as “no more than an ordinary dispute between them” given their history of mutual abuse. Crucially, the court reasoned that Annabelle did not intend to kill Williford as she had ample opportunity to fire the gun, and Williford was "never in any real danger" once he disarmed her. The court distinguished this case from Hoyt v. State (1964), where a wife killed her abusive husband, noting that in Hoyt the abuse was one-sided, repressed, and the immediate provocation was incessant without a cooling-off period. In contrast, Williford’s relationship with Annabelle involved mutual abuse, and he had previously vented his anger and even threatened her life. Therefore, Annabelle's actions did not “naturally and instantly produce the highest degree of exasperation, rage, terror, anger or sudden resentment in the mind of an ordinary person,” especially after Williford disarmed her. The jury's rejection of second-degree murder also suggested that submitting manslaughter would have been an invitation for a compromise verdict.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the stringent requirements for a "heat of passion" defense in Wisconsin, particularly in the context of long-term, mutually abusive relationships. It establishes that a history of conflict, even severe, will not typically justify a manslaughter instruction if there have been opportunities for the defendant to cool off, or if the immediate provocation is not objectively overwhelming once any perceived threat is neutralized. The distinction from Hoyt v. State is critical, highlighting that mutual aggression versus repressed, one-sided abuse can change the legal assessment of provocation. This ruling discourages juries from reaching compromise verdicts on lesser-included offenses unless the evidence undeniably supports the specific legal elements of that offense.
