State v. Wentz
149 Wash.2d 342 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
Under Washington's burglary statute, RCW 9A.04.110(5), a 'fenced area' is included in the definition of a 'building,' and this term stands alone, unmodified by the qualifying phrase 'used for lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit of goods.' Unlawful entry into such a fenced area with criminal intent constitutes burglary.
Facts:
- Gerald Lee Wentz took a pickup truck and a handgun from his brother's home in Oregon.
- Wentz drove to Spokane, Washington, intending to confront his ex-wife, Janet McFadden, and her new boyfriend, Patrick Wheeler, at Wheeler's home.
- After confirming McFadden was at the house, Wentz waited for nightfall.
- Wentz climbed over a six-foot solid wood fence that enclosed Wheeler's backyard; the gates to the fence were padlocked.
- Inside the fenced yard, Wentz opened an unlocked sliding glass door to the house, which triggered a security alarm.
- After the alarm sounded, Wentz hid inside a boat that was parked on a trailer within the fenced backyard.
- Police responded to the alarm and found Wentz hiding in the boat.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Gerald Lee Wentz in a Washington trial court with several counts, including first-degree burglary.
- Following a bench trial, the trial court judge found Wentz guilty on all counts.
- Wentz (appellant) appealed his convictions to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Supreme Court of Washington granted Wentz's petition for review on the sole issue of the first-degree burglary conviction.
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Issue:
Does unlawfully entering a residential backyard enclosed by a six-foot, locked fence constitute burglary by entering a 'building' under RCW 9A.04.110(5), which defines a building to include a 'fenced area'?
Opinions:
Majority - Ireland, J.
Yes. Unlawfully entering a fenced area constitutes entering a 'building' for the purposes of the burglary statute. The court held that the 1975 amendment to the criminal code, which explicitly added 'fenced area' to the definition of 'building' in RCW 9A.04.110(5), rendered the old 'main purpose' test from State v. Roadhs obsolete. Applying the last antecedent rule of statutory construction, the court determined that the qualifying phrase 'used for lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit of goods' applies only to its last antecedent, 'any other structure,' and does not modify the preceding terms, including 'fenced area.' Therefore, the State is not required to prove that a fenced area was used for a specific purpose; its status as a fenced area is sufficient to qualify it as a 'building' under the statute.
Concurring - Madsen, J.
Yes. While the conviction for burglary is correct in this case, the majority's reasoning is overly broad and could lead to absurd results. The term 'fenced area' should not be read in isolation but in the context of the burglary statutes, which are intended to protect persons and property within enclosed spaces. A 'fenced area' should only be considered a 'building' when the fence creates an enclosed space that is designed to provide security for people or property within, rather than being a mere boundary or decorative marker. In this specific case, the six-foot, solid, locked fence clearly served a security function for an area that was an extension of the home's living space, so it qualifies as a 'building' under this more restrictive interpretation.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of Washington's burglary statute by establishing that any 'fenced area' qualifies as a 'building,' thereby broadening the statute's application. The court's use of the last antecedent rule creates a bright-line standard that simplifies prosecutions for entering fenced properties. The holding explicitly overrules prior appellate court decisions that had erroneously continued to apply an outdated legal test. The concurring opinion, however, signals potential future litigation over the limits of this new bright-line rule, particularly in cases involving less substantial or purely decorative fences.
