State v. Waterman
2008 Alas. App. LEXIS 106, 2008 WL 5101802, 196 P.3d 1115 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Alaska Constitution, a confession is presumptively involuntary when induced by police threats of harsher treatment for non-cooperation. Suggesting to a juvenile suspect that their failure to cooperate will be reported to the judge and jury constitutes an inherently coercive threat that renders subsequent admissions involuntary unless the state can affirmatively prove the suspect's will was not overborne.
Facts:
- On November 14, 2004, Lauri Waterman was found dead near Craig, Alaska.
- Police investigation focused on Jason Arrant and Brian Radel, friends of the victim's sixteen-year-old daughter, Rachelle Waterman.
- Arrant and Radel confessed to the murder and implicated Rachelle Waterman, stating she had told them she wanted her mother dead.
- On November 19, 2004, police interviewed Rachelle Waterman for a second time. She was advised of her Miranda rights and her right to have her father present, both of which she waived.
- Waterman initially denied serious involvement, insisting she had told Arrant and Radel not to kill her mother.
- During a break in the interview, Sergeant Habib told Waterman she had a choice: have the officers tell the judge and jury she cooperated and made a mistake, or have them report that she lied to them until the end.
- Following Sergeant Habib's statements, Waterman admitted she was 'pretty sure' her friends were going to kill her mother that weekend and that she failed to stop them during a phone call.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Alaska indicted Rachelle Waterman in Superior Court on charges including murder and conspiracy.
- Waterman filed a pre-trial motion to suppress her November 19 statement, arguing it was involuntary.
- The Superior Court Judge, Patricia Collins, initially denied the motion to suppress.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial, which ended in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict.
- Waterman then filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal.
- While denying the acquittal motion, Judge Collins sua sponte reconsidered her earlier ruling, found the November 19 statement to be involuntary, suppressed it, and dismissed the indictment.
- The State appealed the Superior Court's order dismissing the indictment to the Court of Appeals of Alaska.
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Issue:
Does a police officer's statement to a juvenile suspect that their cooperation or non-cooperation will be reported to the judge and jury constitute an impermissible threat that renders a subsequent confession involuntary under the Alaska Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Coats, Chief Judge
Yes, a police officer's statement to a juvenile suspect that their cooperation or non-cooperation will be reported to the judge and jury constitutes an impermissible threat that renders a subsequent confession involuntary. Citing Beavers v. State, the court held that any police threat of harsher treatment for exercising the right to silence makes a resulting confession presumptively involuntary. Sergeant Habib's ultimatum to Waterman—presenting a choice between being portrayed to the judge and jury as cooperative or as a persistent liar—was an impermissible threat, not merely a truthful statement about the consequences of lying. The court found this tactic inherently coercive, particularly when directed at a juvenile. Because Waterman's key admissions immediately followed this threat, the State could not rebut the presumption that her will was overborne, and the statements made after the threat were therefore involuntary and must be suppressed.
Concurring - Mannheimer, Judge
This opinion does not directly answer the issue but addresses the procedural fairness of the trial court's actions. The concurrence agrees with the majority's conclusion but writes separately to critique the trial judge's decision to sua sponte (on her own initiative) reverse her prior ruling on the confession's admissibility after the trial had concluded. This procedure is problematic because it deprived the parties of the opportunity to present evidence and arguments on the issue, knowing it was being reconsidered. It is psychologically difficult for a judge to reverse a publicly announced decision, making a motion for reconsideration an inadequate substitute for prior briefing and argument.
Analysis:
This case strengthens protections against coercive interrogation under the Alaska Constitution, setting a standard more demanding than federal law. It establishes a clear line for law enforcement, making it impermissible to use the prospect of reporting a suspect's non-cooperation to the court as a tool to elicit a confession. The decision particularly emphasizes the vulnerability of juvenile suspects and reinforces the principle that the right to remain silent cannot be burdened by threats of negative consequences in court. Future cases involving confession voluntariness in Alaska will scrutinize any police statements that link a suspect's cooperation level to how they will be portrayed to the judge or jury.
