State v. Washington
92 S.W.3d 205, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 2168 (2002)
Rule of Law:
For first-degree burglary, an attached garage lacking an interior connection to the home's living quarters is generally not considered part of an "inhabitable structure" because it substantially mitigates the direct danger to occupants that the statute aims to deter, but it can still constitute a "building" for purposes of second-degree burglary.
Facts:
- On August 18, 1999, Mr. Steve Nelson observed an unfamiliar man walking toward the open garage of Ms. Mary Vannice's residence.
- Moments later, Mr. Nelson observed the same man walking away from the garage carrying a leaf blower and a weed trimmer.
- Mr. Nelson later identified the man as Mr. Antwone Washington.
- Ms. Vannice and her teenage son were home in the residence at the time Mr. Washington was observed at the garage.
- The Vannice garage was attached to the home, sharing a common roof and walls, and a covered porch led from the home to the garage, but there was no interior door connecting the garage to the home's living quarters.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Mr. Antwone Washington with first-degree burglary, stealing, and first-degree tampering with a motor vehicle.
- Mr. Washington moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s evidence and again at the close of all evidence, arguing insufficient evidence for first-degree burglary.
- The trial court denied Mr. Washington's motions for judgment of acquittal.
- The jury convicted Mr. Washington of first-degree burglary and stealing, but acquitted him of first-degree tampering with a motor vehicle.
- Mr. Washington, having stipulated to being a prior offender, was sentenced by the trial court to five years in the Missouri Department of Corrections for burglary (suspended, with probation and a condition to complete a program) and thirty days for stealing (concurrent).
- Mr. Washington appealed his convictions to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, preserving only his claim regarding the sufficiency of evidence for first-degree burglary.
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Issue:
Does a garage attached to a residence, but lacking an interior connection to the living quarters, constitute an "inhabitable structure" for the purposes of first-degree burglary under Missouri law, when residents are present in the home?
Opinions:
Majority - Thomas H. Newton
No, a garage attached to a residence but lacking an interior connection to the living quarters does not constitute an "inhabitable structure" for first-degree burglary, even if residents are present in the home; however, it does qualify as a "building" for second-degree burglary. The court determined that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the garage was an "inhabitable structure" as required for a first-degree burglary conviction under § 569.160.1(3) RSMo 1994. While the home itself qualifies as an inhabitable structure, the garage by itself does not, as there was no evidence that any defining activities (living, business, assembly, or overnight accommodation) occurred in the garage. When considering if the garage was part of the home's overall inhabitable structure, the court looked to the General Assembly's intent behind the first-degree burglary statute, which is to increase penalties for putting innocent persons in harm's way during a burglary. The absence of a common doorway connecting the inside of the garage and the inside of the home's living quarters substantially alleviates the danger that the statute seeks to deter. This physical separation distinguishes the case from precedents where living quarters were accessed directly through the burglarized area. Therefore, the State failed to prove Mr. Washington and another person were present in an "inhabitable structure." However, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree burglary, which is a lesser-included offense. Second-degree burglary requires unlawful entry into a "building or inhabitable structure" for the purpose of committing a crime therein, but does not require the presence of another person. The court noted that while "inhabitable structure" was not proven for the garage, a garage fits the general definition of a "building," and the jury's finding of burglary implied entry into a structure that could be considered a building. The court declined plain error review for Mr. Washington's other points on appeal (exclusion of expert testimony, improper closing argument, failure to submit a converse instruction) because they did not establish substantial grounds for believing manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice had occurred.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the interpretation of "inhabitable structure" in the context of first-degree burglary, particularly regarding attached garages. It emphasizes that the physical layout and connectivity of an attached structure to the primary living space are crucial in determining whether it falls under the enhanced protection of first-degree burglary statutes designed to protect occupants from direct harm. The ruling highlights the importance of legislative intent, demonstrating that statutory construction will consider the purpose of a law, such as deterring direct physical danger, when a term's plain meaning is ambiguous. Furthermore, this case serves as an example of an appellate court's authority to reduce a conviction to a lesser-included offense when the evidence is insufficient for the greater charge but meets the elements of the lesser, thereby affirming the court's power to render the judgment that should have been given.
