State v. Wadley
2010 WL 5054404, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 1679, 327 S.W.3d 25 (2010)
Rule of Law:
Missouri law adopts a unilateral theory of conspiracy, meaning a defendant can be convicted if they have the purpose to promote a crime and agree with another, regardless of whether the other person genuinely intends to commit the offense. Furthermore, when a pattern jury instruction (MAI-CR) exists for a defense, it must be used to the exclusion of any other instruction.
Facts:
- Esther Wadley (Defendant) married Joshua Millager (Millager) in October 1996, and they had a daughter named Crystal.
- Defendant separated from Millager in December 2002, and their marriage was dissolved in December 2004, with Millager being awarded sole physical and legal custody of Crystal, which upset Defendant.
- On October 9, 2007, Defendant encountered Paul Bell (a former patient) at the Christian Service Center and asked him if she could hire him to murder Millager.
- On October 11, Defendant and Bell met twice; during the second meeting at Bell's home, Defendant gave Bell an envelope containing Millager's personal identifying information, two photographs of Millager, and specified she wanted Millager 'dead' in a manner that looked like a burglary.
- The next day, Defendant left $200 at the Center for Bell as 'expense money for [Bell] to go find a hit man'.
- Bell, after initially attempting to find a hit man, had a change of heart and contacted the F.B.I., which then involved local law enforcement.
- On October 18, Bell, cooperating with law enforcement, introduced Defendant to Sgt. Mike Rogers, an undercover officer posing as the 'hit man,' and Defendant confirmed to Rogers her desire to have Millager killed and discussed details of the murder.
- Defendant was arrested on December 3, 2007.
Procedural Posture:
- Esther Wadley (Defendant) was charged with the class B felony of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.
- A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder in the trial court.
- After the State rested its case, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied.
- Defendant rested without presenting evidence and subsequently filed a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, which was overruled by the trial court.
- Defendant appealed her conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred in refusing a tendered jury instruction on renunciation.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Is the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder under Missouri's unilateral theory of conspiracy, even when an alleged co-conspirator lacks actual criminal intent? 2. Did the trial court err by refusing to give a defendant's tendered non-pattern jury instruction on the defense of renunciation when an applicable MAI-CR instruction specifying its format existed?
Opinions:
Majority - Jeffrey W. Bates
Yes, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and no, the trial court did not err by refusing the non-pattern renunciation instruction. The court held that the State presented substantial evidence for each element of conspiracy under § 564.016: (1) Defendant's purpose to promote or facilitate Millager's murder, evidenced by her repeated requests to Bell, provision of detailed identifying information, proposed murder plan, and promise of payment; (2) Defendant's intent that Bell and the 'hit man' (Sgt. Rogers) engage in conduct constituting murder, shown by providing expense money, agreeing to meet the hit man, and discussing execution details with the undercover officer; and (3) overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including providing identifying information, furnishing $200, and meeting with the 'hit man.' The court affirmed Missouri's adoption of the unilateral theory of conspiracy, stating that the subjective intent of the other alleged co-conspirators (Bell, Theresa Bell, or Sgt. Rogers) is irrelevant to the defendant's conviction, citing Bishop v. State, State v. Hlavaty, and State v. Welty. Regarding the renunciation instruction, the court found no error in the trial court's refusal to give Defendant's tendered non-MAI-CR instruction. Rule 28.02(c) mandates that when an MAI-CR instruction is applicable and has Notes on Use, it 'shall be given or used to the exclusion of any other instruction.' MAI-CR 3d 304.10, Notes on Use 5, specifically provides the required format for submitting a renunciation defense. Because Defendant's proposed Instruction A did not follow the requirements of the applicable MAI-CR instruction, the trial court properly refused it, as per State v. Greer.
Analysis:
This case is significant for solidifying the application of the unilateral theory of conspiracy in Missouri, making it clear that a defendant's conviction for conspiracy does not require proof that their co-conspirators actually intended to commit the crime. This broadens the scope of conspiracy liability. Additionally, the ruling strictly enforces adherence to MAI-CR pattern jury instructions, emphasizing that trial courts must reject any non-pattern instructions for which a MAI-CR equivalent exists, even if it pertains to a statutorily recognized defense. This maintains uniformity in jury instructions but places a high burden on counsel to ensure proposed instructions precisely match MAI-CR requirements.
