State v. Vorhees
2008 WL 431389, 2008 Mo. LEXIS 11, 248 S.W.3d 585 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's prior, uncharged crimes, even if they share a unique "signature modus operandi," cannot be admitted for the sole purpose of corroborating a victim's testimony, as this constitutes impermissible propensity evidence that violates the defendant's constitutional right to be tried only for the offense charged.
Facts:
- S.W. alleged that her stepfather, Shane Vorhees, repeatedly sexually assaulted her for two years, beginning when she was 13.
- S.W. testified that during these assaults, Vorhees would spit on his hand to use his saliva as a lubricant.
- S.W. also testified that on one occasion, Vorhees urinated in her mouth, and on other occasions, he would ejaculate in her mouth.
- The state sought to introduce testimony from another witness, J.W., about a separate, uncharged incident involving Vorhees.
- J.W. testified that when she was six years old, Vorhees entered her bedroom, restrained her, and attempted to assault her.
- J.W. stated that Vorhees also used his saliva as a lubricant during the attack and urinated in her mouth.
Procedural Posture:
- Shane Vorhees was indicted in the trial court for first-degree statutory rape and first-degree statutory sodomy.
- Prior to trial, the state filed a motion to admit testimony from J.W. concerning prior uncharged sexual abuse by Vorhees.
- The trial court granted the state's motion, finding the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.
- A jury found Vorhees guilty on both counts.
- The trial court sentenced Vorhees to two consecutive terms of imprisonment of thirty years.
- Vorhees appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Missouri, arguing the admission of J.W.'s testimony was unconstitutional.
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Issue:
Does admitting evidence of a defendant's prior, uncharged sexual offenses under a 'signature modus operandi' exception for the sole purpose of corroborating an alleged victim's testimony violate the defendant's right under the Missouri Constitution to be tried only for the offense charged?
Opinions:
Majority - Wolff, J.
Yes, admitting evidence of a defendant's prior, uncharged sexual offenses under a 'signature modus operandi' exception for the sole purpose of corroborating an alleged victim's testimony violates the defendant's right under the Missouri Constitution to be tried only for the offense charged. This 'corroboration' exception is fundamentally propensity evidence masquerading as a valid exception. Its reasoning—that if a defendant committed a similar crime before, it is more likely he committed the current one, thus making the victim's testimony more credible—directly undermines the constitutional prohibition against trying a defendant for his character or past acts. The distinction between admitting evidence to prove the defendant committed the crime and admitting it to show the victim is telling the truth is 'too fine to support a constitutionally-dubious evidentiary exception.' Prior cases establishing this exception, such as State v. Bernard and State v. Gilyard, are overruled to the extent they conflict with this holding.
Dissenting - Price, J.
No, admitting such evidence under these circumstances does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The court should not overrule its precedent in State v. Bernard and State v. Gilyard. When two or more victims independently report the same highly distinctive and unusual acts, evidence of the earlier acts is probative of the veracity of the current victim's testimony. The defendant's actions described in this case were sufficiently distinctive to warrant admission due to their high probative value.
Analysis:
This decision significantly restricts the use of prior bad acts evidence in Missouri criminal trials, specifically eliminating the 'signature modus operandi/corroboration' exception. By labeling this exception as impermissible propensity evidence, the court brings Missouri law in line with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the majority of state jurisdictions. This ruling forces prosecutors to fit prior acts evidence into one of the traditional, well-established exceptions (motive, intent, identity, etc.) rather than using it simply to bolster the credibility of a complaining witness. The decision reinforces the fundamental constitutional principle that a defendant must be tried on the evidence of the specific crime charged, not on evidence of their general character or past conduct.
