State v. Vergo
1992 WL 9562, 594 So. 2d 1360 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court has broad discretion in granting challenges for cause to prospective jurors who exhibit bias or an inability to apply the law, and refusal of special jury instructions is not reversible error if the instruction is not wholly correct, pertinent, or supported by the evidence, and does not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights.
Facts:
- About 9:45 p.m. on September 20, 1988, Cynthia Johnson and Tamala Vergo drove to a convenience store next to A.B. Palmer Park in Shreveport, an area known for drug activity, to obtain cocaine.
- Lawrence Adams handed Johnson gravel rocks, and Andre McDonald gave Vergo a small package of rock cocaine to inspect.
- Johnson returned the gravel rocks Adams had given her and began backing the car.
- Someone in the crowd yelled that Vergo had a gun, and McDonald, reaching into the car, grabbed the package of rock cocaine from Vergo.
- Vergo then pointed a pistol and fired two shots toward the males who began running toward the park.
- One shot hit a fence post, and the other fatally wounded William David McKinney, a distant bystander in the line of fire.
- An unknown person or persons in the park fired shots at the automobile, causing it to stall.
- Vergo and Johnson ran from the vehicle into the convenience store, yelling for police, and hid the pistol in the restroom toilet where it was later found by police.
- Police escorted Vergo and Johnson from the scene as a larger crowd assembled and reacted to McKinney's fatal shooting.
Procedural Posture:
- Tamala Vergo was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in 1990.
- Vergo appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err by granting the state's challenges for cause against two prospective jurors and by refusing to give the defendant's requested special jury instructions on causation and negligent homicide?
Opinions:
Majority - Marvin, C.J.
No, the trial court did not err in granting the state's challenges for cause against two prospective jurors or in refusing to give the defendant's requested special jury instructions. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and such rulings are not disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. A challenge for cause is proper if a juror is not impartial or will not accept the law as instructed. Prospective juror Leonard stated he was not open-minded, believed Vergo was innocent due to his knowledge of the area, and could not be a fair and impartial juror, requiring 'very strong evidence' beyond the legal burden of proof. Prospective juror Sherman repeatedly stated she had made up her mind about the case, believing Vergo's conduct was justified, and would require greater proof than the law demands to change her mind. Their responses revealed bias and an inability to apply the law, justifying the challenges. The erroneous granting of a challenge for cause is not reversible error unless it allows the state more peremptory challenges, which was not shown here. Regarding jury instructions, a special charge must be given if it is wholly correct, pertinent, and not included in the general charge. Refusal is not reversible error unless it prejudices substantial rights. The requested causation instruction was not necessary because the jury, under the given instructions, could have found that Vergo's deliberate and intentional firing of a pistol toward fleeing persons constituted aggravated assault (a misdemeanor directly affecting the person), which is a predicate for misdemeanor-manslaughter (LRS 14:31(2)(a)). Even if the homicide was an unintended consequence, Vergo's general intent to scare the crowd by firing the pistol satisfied the element of being engaged in the perpetration of aggravated assault, a general intent crime. The requested negligent homicide instruction was not wholly correct and was not fairly supported by the record. All witnesses testified that Vergo pointed and fired the pistol in the direction the crowd was fleeing, demonstrating deliberate action rather than mere criminal negligence. Vergo's argument alone was insufficient to suggest that she was only guilty of negligent homicide. Thus, the trial court properly refused both special instructions.
Dissenting - Victory, J.
I dissent from the denial of rehearing. A rehearing should be granted on the issue of whether, under the facts presented, the jury should have been charged on the law of negligent homicide.
Dissenting - Brown, J.
I dissent from the denial of rehearing. A rehearing should be granted on the issue of whether, under the facts presented, the jury should have been charged on the law of negligent homicide.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the significant deference given to a trial court's discretion in jury selection, particularly when potential jurors exhibit clear bias or an unwillingness to follow legal instructions, making it difficult for defendants to overturn convictions on these grounds. It clarifies the standards for special jury instructions, emphasizing that they must be legally correct and supported by evidence, preventing instructions based solely on defense arguments. The application of the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule in this context demonstrates how a general intent crime (aggravated assault) can form the basis for an unintentional homicide, highlighting the breadth of criminal liability when dangerous actions lead to unforeseen deaths. This decision provides critical guidance for future cases regarding the evidentiary threshold required to warrant jury instructions on lesser-included offenses like negligent homicide.
