State v. Toscano
378 A.2d 755, 74 N.J. 421 (1977)
Rule of Law:
The defense of duress is available for a crime other than murder if the defendant was coerced by the use, or threatened use, of unlawful force against their person or another, which a person of reasonable firmness in the defendant's situation would have been unable to resist.
Facts:
- Dr. Joseph Toscano, a chiropractor, was acquainted with William Leonardo, a man he knew to have a criminal record and a reputation for violence.
- Leonardo was the leader of a conspiracy that staged accidents to defraud insurance companies.
- After a mistake in a prior fraudulent claim involving the Kemper Insurance Company, Leonardo needed a new doctor's report to continue the scheme.
- Leonardo contacted Toscano by phone three times, demanding that he create a false medical report.
- During the third call, Leonardo threatened Toscano and his wife, stating, 'Remember, you just moved into a place that has a very dark entrance and you leave there with your wife... You and your wife are going to jump at shadows when you leave that dark entrance.'
- Fearing for his and his wife's safety, Toscano agreed to prepare and deliver a false medical report and bill for an individual named Michael Hanaway.
- Toscano received no compensation for his involvement.
- After the incident, Toscano moved to a new address, obtained an unlisted phone number, and applied for a gun permit out of fear of Leonardo.
Procedural Posture:
- Joseph Toscano was indicted by an Essex County Grand Jury for conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses.
- At trial in the court of first instance, Toscano raised the defense of duress.
- The trial judge ruled that the alleged threat was not 'present, imminent and impending' and refused to instruct the jury on the duress defense.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Toscano was convicted.
- Toscano, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the threat was not imminent and that Toscano had an opportunity to report the matter to the police.
- The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to review the case.
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Issue:
Does the defense of duress require a threat of present, imminent, and impending harm, or should it be assessed under a more flexible standard based on what a person of reasonable firmness would do in the defendant's situation?
Opinions:
Majority - Pashman, J.
No. The defense of duress does not strictly require a threat of present, imminent, and impending harm, but rather depends on whether a person of reasonable firmness in the defendant's situation would have been unable to resist the coercion. The court abandons the rigid common law rule, which is often described as the 'gun at the head' standard, because it is insufficient to address situations where threats of future harm are potent, where seeking police protection is unrealistic, or where prolonged pressure breaks down resistance. The new standard, adopted from the proposed New Jersey Penal Code, allows the jury to consider all circumstances of the defendant's situation, including the gravity of the threat, the seriousness of the crime, and any opportunities for escape or resistance. The court also holds that duress is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Conford, P. J. A. D.
No. The author agrees with the majority's decision to adopt the more flexible 'person of reasonable firmness' standard for the duress defense and to reverse the conviction. However, the author dissents from the majority's decision to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. He argues that once the defendant introduces evidence of duress, the state should bear the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, consistent with the traditional treatment of affirmative defenses and the fundamental principle of criminal law. Requiring the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence would permit a jury to convict even if it holds a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted with free will.
Analysis:
This decision significantly modernizes the duress defense in New Jersey by replacing the rigid common law requirement of 'imminent' harm with the more flexible Model Penal Code standard of a 'person of reasonable firmness.' This shift allows juries to consider a broader range of coercive situations, including threats of future harm. The case also establishes a new procedural framework by making duress an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, a departure from the usual rule that the prosecution must disprove affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. This creates a higher evidentiary hurdle for defendants seeking to use the defense, balancing its expanded substantive scope.
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