State v. Torres
2002 WL 1587057, 82 S.W.3d 236, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
In a capital sentencing hearing, a trial court errs by giving a supplemental instruction encouraging a deadlocked jury to reach a verdict when the jury has deliberated for a substantial period and reported an unequivocal impasse.
Facts:
- William Pierre Torres lived in an apartment with his girlfriend, Jasma Nishee Wilson, and their fifteen-month-old son, Quintyn.
- Torres was the primary daytime caregiver for Quintyn while Wilson worked.
- On the morning of June 29, 1994, Wilson left Quintyn, who was healthy and uninjured, in the sole care of Torres.
- Around midday, Torres called Wilson at work and told her that Quintyn had fallen from his crib and was not breathing.
- Wilson rushed home to find Quintyn unresponsive; Torres had not yet sought medical assistance.
- Quintyn was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. An autopsy revealed severe injuries, including multiple blunt-force trauma injuries to the head and abdomen and retinal hemorrhaging, which were inconsistent with a fall from a crib.
- Torres initially told police that Quintyn had fallen from his crib.
- In a subsequent statement, Torres admitted that he had shaken Quintyn out of frustration when the child would not stop crying.
Procedural Posture:
- William Pierre Torres was convicted of first degree murder by aggravated child abuse in a state trial court.
- Following a sentencing hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death.
- Torres, as appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court, the state's highest court, granted review of the case.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by giving a 'Kersey' instruction to a capital sentencing jury that has deliberated for approximately six hours and reported an unequivocal deadlock with a specific numeric split?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Yes. The trial court erred by giving the 'Kersey' instruction rather than accepting the jury’s report of a deadlock. While a trial court generally has discretion to give a 'Kersey' instruction to a tentatively deadlocked jury in a capital sentencing proceeding, that discretion was abused here. The court distinguished this case from State v. Caruthers, where a similar instruction was upheld, by noting several key differences: the jury here deliberated for a much longer period (six hours vs. three), its note reported an unequivocal deadlock ('he will not change his mind'), and the note identified the gender of the lone dissenting juror, thereby increasing the coercive pressure of the instruction. The court reasoned that in a capital case, where the need for reliability is paramount and the societal cost of a hung jury (a retrial) is absent, any instruction that might coerce a juror into surrendering a conscientiously held view is an error of the 'first magnitude.' Given the unequivocal nature of the deadlock, the trial court should have followed the statutory procedure under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(h), accepted the deadlock, and instructed the jury to consider only the sentences of life and life without parole.
Analysis:
This decision refines the application of the 'Kersey' instruction in capital sentencing hearings, placing a significant limit on a trial judge's discretion. It establishes that while not categorically forbidden, a supplemental charge to a deadlocked jury is impermissibly coercive when the jury's communication indicates a firm and final impasse after substantial deliberation. The ruling emphasizes the heightened standard of reliability required in death penalty jurisprudence, prioritizing the integrity of individual juror convictions over the desire for a unanimous verdict on death. This precedent will guide lower courts to be far more cautious before issuing such instructions and to more readily accept a jury's report of a deadlock as final, thereby triggering statutory alternative sentencing procedures.
