State v. Tippetts
180 Or. App. 350, 43 P. 3d 455 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
For criminal liability to attach, the defendant's conduct must include a voluntary act. An act is not voluntary if it is the result of coercion or force, such as when police transport an arrestee into a correctional facility against their will.
Facts:
- Police officers obtained and executed a search warrant for defendant Tippetts's house.
- Upon entering, officers saw Tippetts run towards the back of the house before they subdued and handcuffed him.
- An initial search of Tippetts's person revealed no drugs or contraband.
- A subsequent search of the house uncovered methamphetamine and a weapon, leading to Tippetts's formal arrest.
- Police transported Tippetts against his will to the Washington County Jail.
- At the jail, an officer asked Tippetts if he possessed any contraband before conducting a search.
- During this second search, the officer discovered a small bag of marijuana in Tippetts's pants pocket.
Procedural Posture:
- The state charged Tippetts in a state trial court with supplying contraband under ORS 162.185(1)(a).
- At trial, Tippetts moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state failed to prove he had voluntarily introduced the contraband into the jail.
- The trial court denied the motion.
- Following a conviction, Tippetts (as appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeals of Oregon, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal.
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Issue:
Does a person 'voluntarily' introduce contraband into a correctional facility under Oregon law if they are arrested while possessing the contraband and then involuntarily transported to the facility by police?
Opinions:
Majority - Kistler, J.
No. A person does not voluntarily introduce contraband into a correctional facility when they are arrested and involuntarily transported there by police. The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance of a voluntary act. A 'voluntary act' requires more than mere awareness; it necessitates that the person had the ability to choose to commit the act that gives rise to criminal liability. In this case, Tippetts did not initiate the introduction of marijuana into the jail or cause it to be introduced; rather, the contraband entered the jail only because the police took him there against his will. The court rejected the state's argument that Tippetts's prior voluntary act of possessing the marijuana was sufficient. Citing the Model Penal Code, the court reasoned that an involuntary act can only be linked to a prior voluntary act if the involuntary act was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the prior act. Here, being arrested and taken to jail was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of simply possessing marijuana.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the 'voluntary act' requirement for criminal liability, establishing that the actus reus of a crime must itself be voluntary. It prevents the state from prosecuting an individual for the more serious offense of introducing contraband into a facility when the introduction is solely the product of the state's action in arresting and transporting the individual. The ruling reinforces the principle that criminal fault requires a choice or volitional conduct by the defendant. It limits the state's ability to hold a defendant liable for the consequences of being taken into custody, requiring a direct link of foreseeability between a prior voluntary act and a later involuntary act.
