State v. Thibeault
402 A.2d 445 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
Under Maine's burglary statute, a person who enters a structure with the consent of the lawful possessor is not guilty of burglary, even if they enter with the intent to commit a crime therein. The element requiring the person to know they are not 'licensed or privileged' to enter is separate and distinct from the element requiring intent to commit a crime.
Facts:
- Dale Thibeault and David Gardner had been friends for several years.
- David Gardner and his wife, Debbie Gardner, were cotenants of an apartment.
- Prior to December 9, 1977, David Gardner gave Thibeault blanket permission to enter the apartment at any time.
- On the evening of December 9, 1977, Thibeault entered the Gardners' apartment.
- After entering, Thibeault took certain valuables from the apartment.
- David Gardner later testified that he had not given Thibeault permission to remove property from the apartment.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Maine prosecuted Dale Thibeault in the Superior Court, Penobscot County, for burglary.
- A jury returned a verdict finding Thibeault guilty of Class B burglary.
- The trial court sentenced Thibeault to a term of six years at the Maine State Prison.
- Thibeault (as appellant) appealed his conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, arguing that the trial judge's jury instruction on the elements of burglary was erroneous.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's intent to commit a crime within a structure negate the lawful possessor's permission to enter for the purposes of a burglary conviction under a statute requiring the defendant to know they are not 'licensed or privileged' to enter?
Opinions:
Majority - Delahanty, J.
No. A defendant's intent to commit a crime does not negate the lawful possessor's permission to enter for the purposes of a burglary conviction under Maine's burglary statute. The statute requires the prosecution to prove four separate elements: (1) entry, (2) of a structure, (3) with the knowledge that the entry is not licensed or privileged, and (4) with the intent to commit a crime therein. The court held that the question of whether a defendant had permission to enter (the 'license or privilege' element) must be resolved independently of the defendant's alleged intent. To allow a defendant's criminal intent to negate permission would render the 'license or privilege' language in the statute superfluous, effectively removing the common law's core requirement of a trespassory entry. The court reasoned that the legislature, by using the phrase 'knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so,' intended to retain the trespassory aspect of common law burglary while eliminating the outdated and often illogical 'breaking' element related to physical force.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that Maine's modern burglary statute retains the common law's requirement of a trespassory entry, even though it discards the 'breaking' element. It establishes that consent is a complete defense to burglary, separating the act of entry from the actor's intent. This precedent prevents prosecutors from elevating a theft into a burglary simply because the defendant formed the intent to steal before entering a place they were otherwise allowed to be. The ruling solidifies the principle that burglary is fundamentally a crime against the security of a structure from unauthorized intrusion, not just a crime that happens to occur within a structure.
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