State v. Tecca
714 P.2d 136, 220 Mont. 168, 1986 Mont. LEXIS 812 (1986)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's prior wrongful acts, even those remote in time, is admissible if the acts are part of a continuous pattern of similar conduct that tends to establish a common scheme, plan, or system.
Facts:
- On the evening of November 8, 1984, N.L., an eleven-year-old girl, was staying overnight at the residence of her friend, Cindy Tecca.
- Lee Tecca, Cindy's 23-year-old half-brother, was living in the home at the time.
- That evening, Tecca provided beer to N.L. and Cindy, and later took them for a drive where he purchased more beer for them to drink.
- Upon returning home around 10:30 p.m., the girls went to sleep in sleeping bags in the basement.
- N.L. testified that she was awakened by Tecca, who was kneeling beside her wearing only his underwear.
- Tecca had his hand inside N.L.'s underpants with his finger in her vagina.
- When Tecca asked N.L. to roll over, she refused, and he subsequently left.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Montana filed an information charging Lee Tecca with felony sexual assault in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County.
- The prosecution filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of Tecca's other wrongful acts.
- Tecca's counsel filed a motion in limine to bar the introduction of the prior acts evidence.
- The district court judge denied the motion in limine, and denied it again upon a motion for reconsideration.
- Following a trial, a jury found Tecca guilty of felony sexual assault.
- Tecca, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, with the State of Montana as respondent.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior sexual misconduct with young girls, some of which occurred up to nine years earlier, violate Rule 404(b) of the Montana Rules of Evidence when the acts demonstrate a continuous pattern of conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Frank R. Morrison, Jr.
No, the admission of evidence of Tecca's prior sexual misconduct does not violate the Montana Rules of Evidence. The court applied the four-element test from State v. Just to determine the admissibility of the prior acts evidence: (1) similarity of acts, (2) nearness in time, (3) tendency to establish a common scheme, and (4) probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice. The court found sufficient similarity because all incidents involved young girls in the Tecca home and demonstrated a sexual interest. Regarding the nearness in time, the court held that while an isolated incident from nine years ago would be too remote, the evidence here showed a 'continuing pattern of similar conduct' that 'alleviated' the remoteness problem. This pattern of deviate sexual conduct over nine years established a common scheme under the third prong. Finally, the court concluded that the probative value of the evidence in establishing opportunity, intent, identity, and corroborating the young victim's testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Tecca. The court also found that the trial court properly followed the procedural requirements for admitting such evidence, including providing a limiting instruction to the jury.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'nearness in time' requirement for admitting prior acts evidence under the framework established in State v. Just. The court establishes that remoteness is not a bar to admissibility when the prior acts are part of a continuous and consistent pattern of behavior, rather than isolated events. This precedent gives prosecutors greater latitude to introduce a defendant's history in cases, particularly sexual assault cases, where a common scheme or plan can be demonstrated over a long period. It signals that courts will look at the overall pattern of conduct rather than applying an arbitrary time limit for the admissibility of prior acts.
