State v. . Tackett
8 N.C. 210 (1820)
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Rule of Law:
Under the common law of a slave-holding society, acts by a slave that would not constitute legal provocation if committed by a white person may be sufficient to extenuate the crime of a white person who kills that slave from murder to manslaughter.
Facts:
- A white person, the prisoner, had pre-existing resentment towards a slave, the deceased, which had manifested in threats and quarrels.
- The prisoner killed the slave.
- There was no direct proof of the immediate provocation under which the homicide was committed; the evidence was entirely circumstantial.
- At trial, the prisoner sought to introduce evidence of the deceased slave's general character, specifically that he was known to be turbulent and insolent toward white persons.
Procedural Posture:
- A white man (the prisoner) was prosecuted in a trial court for the murder of a slave.
- During the trial, the court excluded evidence offered by the defense regarding the slave's general character.
- The trial court instructed the jury that the case must be determined by the same rules and principles of law as if the deceased had been a white man.
- The prisoner was convicted.
- The prisoner appealed the conviction to this Court, arguing the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling and jury instructions.
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Issue:
Does the common law standard for legal provocation, which can reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter, differ when a white man kills a slave compared to when he kills another white man, thereby making evidence of the slave's character admissible?
Opinions:
Majority - Taylor, Chief-Justice
Yes, the common law standard for legal provocation is different when a slave is the victim. Acts by a slave can constitute legal provocation even if the same acts by a white person would not. The court reasoned that the trial court erred in two ways. First, it should have admitted evidence of the deceased slave's character, as a 'turbulent and insolent' disposition could make it more probable that the prisoner acted under strong and legal provocation. Second, the trial court's instruction to apply the same rules as if the victim were a white man was incorrect. The court held that the common law must adapt to the 'habits, institutions and actual condition of the citizens,' which includes the institution of slavery. It explicitly stated that while words or insulting gestures from a white person are not sufficient provocation, such acts from a slave could be, reflecting the different social relation between a white person and a slave. The court also clarified that any blow, not just one threatening great bodily harm, can be sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter if the killing is immediate and in the heat of passion.
Analysis:
This decision legally entrenches a racial and status-based double standard within the common law of homicide. By ruling that the standard for provocation depends on the victim's status as enslaved, the court formally recognized that a slave's life was less protected by law than a white person's. This precedent validated a white person's violent reaction to a slave's perceived insolence, reinforcing the social and legal hierarchy of slavery. The case demonstrates the flexibility of the common law in adapting to and upholding the 'peculiar institution' of the American South, shaping legal doctrine to maintain social control.
