State v. Summrell
192 S.E.2d 569, 282 N.C. 157, 1972 N.C. LEXIS 924 (1972)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A disorderly conduct statute that is facially overbroad for prohibiting speech that may merely 'alarm or disturb' others can be rendered constitutional through a narrowing judicial construction that limits its application to unprotected 'fighting words'—utterances plainly likely to provoke violent retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace.
Facts:
- An intoxicated defendant was brought to a hospital emergency room for treatment.
- The defendant refused medical attention from a white physician and demanded to be seen by a black doctor.
- Upon being informed that a black doctor was not immediately available, the defendant began shouting profanities.
- The defendant's utterances included cursing all white people and making unfounded complaints in a loud voice.
- His conduct disturbed a nurse and agitated other patients who were waiting for medical attention in the emergency room.
- When a police officer, Officer Phillips, attempted to arrest the defendant for disorderly conduct, the defendant physically resisted and assaulted the officer.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged in trial court via three separate warrants for disorderly conduct, resisting an officer, and assaulting an officer.
- At trial, the defendant filed a motion to quash the disorderly conduct warrant, arguing the underlying statute, G.S. 14-288.4, was unconstitutional.
- The trial judge denied the motion to quash but found parts of the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
- The judge issued a narrowing construction, limiting the statute's application to 'fighting words' likely to provoke a breach of the peace, and permitted the State to amend the warrant accordingly.
- A jury convicted the defendant on all three charges, and he was given concurrent sentences.
- The defendant appealed his convictions to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
- The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina to review the constitutional question.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a disorderly conduct statute that prohibits 'any offensively coarse utterance... or abusive language, in such manner as to alarm or disturb any person present' violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad?
Opinions:
Majority - Sharp, J.
Yes, a disorderly conduct statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad if it punishes speech merely because it is 'offensively coarse' or tends to 'alarm and disturb' persons, as this encompasses speech protected by the First Amendment. However, such a statute can be constitutionally applied if it is authoritatively construed to prohibit only unprotected 'fighting words.' The court reasoned that while the public expression of ideas cannot be prohibited merely because they are offensive, speech that falls into the 'well defined and narrowly limited' class of 'fighting words' is not constitutionally protected, citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. The trial judge properly invoked a severability clause to narrow the statute, construing it to prohibit only words and conduct likely to provoke ordinary people to violence. This saving construction aligns with the legislative intent and avoids constitutional issues. Applying this narrowed standard, the defendant's conduct—shouting profanities in a hospital emergency room, a special environment requiring order and tranquility—constituted fighting words and a substantial interference not protected by the First Amendment.
Analysis:
This decision exemplifies the doctrine of 'saving construction,' where a court reinterprets a facially unconstitutional statute to make it constitutional rather than striking it down entirely. It reinforces the 'fighting words' exception to the First Amendment, affirming that states can regulate speech that is plainly likely to incite an immediate breach of the peace. The ruling also underscores the importance of context in First Amendment analyses, establishing that rights may be applied differently 'in light of the special characteristics of the environment,' such as a hospital, where the state's interest in maintaining order is paramount. This case serves as a precedent for how to handle overbroad statutes that regulate speech, favoring judicial narrowing over facial invalidation.
