State v. Sullivan
146 Me. 381, 1951 Me. LEXIS 37, 82 A.2d 629 (1951)
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Rule of Law:
To convict a defendant for attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to put the vehicle into motion.
Facts:
- John Sullivan's automobile was parked on a grade with its hood up.
- A mechanic, Freeman Dixon, was standing on the bumper working on the engine.
- Dixon requested that Sullivan get into the car and start the motor so Dixon could test the fuel pump.
- Sullivan sat in the driver's seat and started the engine, while Dixon fed gas to the engine by hand.
- No power was applied from the motor to the wheels of the vehicle.
- At the mechanic's direction, Sullivan shut off the motor.
- After the motor was shut off, the car rolled backwards approximately one foot and its rear bumper came into contact with the front bumper of the mechanic's parked truck.
- Police officers who were passing by investigated the noise and arrested Sullivan upon concluding he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Procedural Posture:
- John Sullivan was charged in Caribou Municipal Court with attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
- The Municipal Court, a court of first instance, found Sullivan guilty.
- Sullivan (appellant) appealed the conviction to the Superior Court for Aroostook County for a new trial.
- The case was tried before a jury in the Superior Court.
- At the close of testimony, Sullivan's counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing the evidence was insufficient for a conviction.
- The Superior Court judge denied the motion for a directed verdict.
- Sullivan (respondent/appellant) brought exceptions to the Law Court, the state's highest court, challenging the Superior Court's denial of his motion.
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Issue:
Does an intoxicated person's act of starting a car's engine at the request of a mechanic for the sole purpose of testing the engine, without any intent to put the car in motion, constitute an 'attempt to operate' a motor vehicle in violation of the statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Fellows, J.
No. An attempt to operate a motor vehicle requires proof of a specific intent to commit the offense of operating, which means an intent to move the vehicle. The statute distinguishes between 'operation' and an 'attempt to operate,' and an essential element of an attempt is the criminal intent to complete the act. Here, the evidence of intent is wholly lacking; in fact, the State's own evidence demonstrates there was no such intent. Sullivan started the engine solely at the mechanic's request for the purpose of repairs. The mechanic controlled the fuel supply by hand, and no power was ever transmitted to the wheels. The slight backward movement of the car is attributable to gravity and vibration after the engine was shut off, not to any action by Sullivan intended to move the vehicle. A conviction cannot be sustained on conjecture or suspicion, and without proof of the essential element of intent, a directed verdict for the respondent should have been granted.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the mens rea (criminal intent) required for an 'attempt' crime in the context of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. It establishes that merely manipulating a vehicle's controls, such as starting the engine, is insufficient for a conviction without accompanying proof of a specific intent to set the vehicle in motion. The case reinforces the principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, protecting individuals from convictions based on actions that lack the requisite criminal purpose. This precedent is crucial in distinguishing preparatory acts from a true criminal attempt, requiring courts to look beyond the physical act to the defendant's state of mind.
