State v. Stroud
683 P.2d 459, 210 Mont. 58, 1984 Mont. LEXIS 930 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
When the prosecution gives notice of its intent to introduce 'other crimes or acts' evidence, a trial court's failure to provide a limiting instruction to the jury does not constitute reversible error unless the defense counsel objects or requests such an instruction.
Facts:
- Douglas Stroud and Annette Stroud were divorced in January 1982, but their property settlement and child custody arrangements were still in dispute.
- During their marriage, Stroud had committed several acts of physical violence against Annette, including pointing guns at her and threatening her with a knife.
- On the evening of March 13, 1982, Annette's new acquaintance, Curt Jacky, was an overnight guest at the former marital home where Annette was residing.
- Stroud, aware of Jacky's presence, armed himself with a .357 revolver and told his girlfriend to have his lawyer's number ready in case he got into trouble.
- In the early morning of March 14, Stroud used a key to enter the house without permission and found Annette and Jacky in bed.
- Stroud took photographs of the couple, threatened them with the gun, and stated, 'sit down or I'll kill you.'
- A struggle ensued between Stroud and the unarmed Jacky, which moved from the bedroom down a flight of stairs.
- During the altercation, Stroud shot and killed Jacky.
Procedural Posture:
- Douglas McKenzie Stroud was charged with deliberate homicide for the death of Curt Jacky.
- The case was tried before a jury in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, a state trial court.
- The defense moved to discharge the jury panel because the judge had held a pre-trial, unrecorded meeting with prospective jurors without the defendant or counsel present; the motion was denied.
- The trial court admitted testimony regarding Stroud's prior acts of violence against his ex-wife.
- The trial judge instructed the jury on deliberate homicide, mitigated deliberate homicide, and negligent homicide, over the State's objection to the latter two.
- The jury acquitted Stroud of deliberate and mitigated deliberate homicide but found him guilty of negligent homicide.
- The trial judge sentenced Stroud to ten years imprisonment with seven suspended, plus an additional ten years for using a dangerous weapon.
- Stroud, as appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Montana.
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Issue:
Does a trial court's failure to give a limiting instruction regarding 'other crimes or acts' evidence constitute reversible error when defense counsel does not object to the omission or request such an instruction?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Gulbrandson
No, a trial court's failure to give a limiting instruction is not reversible error under these circumstances. Once the State provides notice that it will introduce evidence of other crimes, the remaining procedural safeguards from State v. Just—a judicial admonition and a cautionary instruction—become mandatory only upon the defendant's objection and/or request. To allow defense counsel to remain silent while a trial judge fails to admonish a jury is tantamount to permitting counsel to consciously plant errors in the trial proceedings. While trial judges should, sua sponte, give a limiting instruction, the failure to do so in the absence of a request is not reversible error.
Dissenting - Justice Sheehy
Yes, the failure to give the instruction should be reversible error. It does not make judicial sense to state that the District Court must sua sponte give a limiting instruction on other crimes evidence, and then fault defense counsel for not objecting when the District Court fails in its duty. The court entraps itself by its own neglect. It is unfair to the defendant, whose innocence should be presumed, to lose an appeal based on an oversight of the court, especially when it is the state that benefits from the introduction of the prejudicial evidence.
Analysis:
This decision significantly modifies the procedural requirements for admitting 'other crimes or acts' evidence established in State v. Just. It shifts the procedural burden from the trial court having a non-waivable, sua sponte duty to provide limiting instructions to the defense counsel having the obligation to object or request them to preserve the issue for appeal. This holding effectively treats the failure to object as a waiver of the procedural protection, making it critical for defense attorneys to be vigilant and affirmatively request such instructions. Consequently, this precedent will likely reduce the number of convictions reversed on this specific procedural ground.
