State v. Strickland
27 N.C. App. 40, 217 S.E.2d 758, 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 1745 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
A statute containing a specific, clear prohibition of conduct is not unconstitutionally vague, even if it is linked to a general definition that is potentially vague, because the specific language provides adequate notice of the proscribed act.
Facts:
- Defendants were present in a building or facility of a public or private educational institution.
- The chief administrative officer of the institution, or their authorized representative, ordered the defendants to vacate the premises.
- The defendants intentionally refused to obey the order to vacate the building.
- As a result of their refusal, warrants were issued charging the defendants with disorderly conduct.
Procedural Posture:
- Warrants were issued in a North Carolina trial court charging the defendants with disorderly conduct under G.S. 14-288.4.
- The defendants filed a motion to quash the warrants, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion to quash.
- The State, as appellant, appealed the trial court's order to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina; the defendants are the appellees.
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Issue:
Is North Carolina General Statute § 14-288.4(a)(4)a, which criminalizes the refusal to vacate a school building upon order from an administrator, unconstitutionally vague because it is categorized under the potentially vague general definition of 'public disturbance'?
Opinions:
Majority - Parker, J.
No. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague. A statute provides adequate warning and meets constitutional requirements when its language is sufficiently clear for a person of common intelligence to understand what conduct is condemned. Even assuming the general definition of 'public disturbance' is vague, the specific subsection at issue, G.S. 14-288.4(a)(4)a, is not. Under a standard rule of statutory construction, specific terms that follow general terms operate to limit and restrict the general ones. Therefore, one must look to the specific examples of prohibited conduct, not the general definition, to understand what the statute forbids. Furthermore, the statute's severability clause indicates the legislature's intent that valid portions of the act should stand even if other parts are found invalid. The specific subsection clearly defines the prohibited conduct—intentionally refusing to vacate a school building after being ordered to by an authorized official—and thus provides sufficient notice to withstand a vagueness challenge.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the judicial principle of avoiding constitutional questions when a statute can be reasonably construed to be constitutional. It highlights the power of specific enumerations in a statute to cure potential vagueness in a general definition. The court's use of severability and the canon of construction where the specific governs the general provides a clear roadmap for upholding statutes against vagueness challenges. This case serves as a precedent for how to analyze statutes that contain both broad, potentially problematic language and clear, specific prohibitions, favoring the preservation of legislative acts where possible.
