State v. Stone
1993 WL 57645, 615 So. 2d 38 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for attempted armed robbery requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to take something of value; this intent cannot be inferred solely from the act of committing a violent assault with a dangerous weapon inside a commercial establishment.
Facts:
- On November 11, 1991, Cheryl Stone entered an I-49 Exxon station shortly after midnight where Judy Crostenburg was working alone.
- Stone gathered several store items and placed them on a counter away from the cash register.
- After asking Crostenburg for assistance with a microwave and an ice cup, Stone attacked Crostenburg with a knife, cutting her neck.
- During the ensuing struggle, Stone stated, "I quit, I give up," and dropped the knife when instructed.
- A customer, Noel Cotten, entered the store, saw the situation, and restrained Stone until police arrived.
- At no point during the incident did Stone demand money or property, nor did she make any overt act to take the items she had gathered or to access the cash register.
Procedural Posture:
- Cheryl Stone was charged with attempted armed robbery.
- Following a trial in the state trial court, Stone was convicted of the charge.
- Stone, as defendant-appellant, appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, arguing that the evidence presented by the State of Louisiana, plaintiff-appellee, was insufficient to support the conviction.
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Issue:
Does the act of physically attacking a store clerk with a knife, without any accompanying demand for money or property or any attempt to take items, constitute sufficient evidence to prove the specific intent required for a conviction of attempted armed robbery?
Opinions:
Majority - Yelverton, Judge
No. The evidence presented is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to commit armed robbery. To sustain a conviction for an attempt crime, the state must prove both a specific intent to commit the target offense and an overt act tending toward its commission. For armed robbery, the required specific intent is the intent to take something of value from another by force or intimidation while armed. In this case, the state failed to prove Stone's intent to take anything. She made no verbal demands, the attack occurred away from the cash register, and she made no effort to leave with the store items she had collected. The court concluded that while Stone's actions constituted a serious crime, such as aggravated battery, the evidence did not support an inference of intent to rob, as the attack could have been motivated by other factors, such as anger. Therefore, a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of attempted armed robbery proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Analysis:
This case highlights the stringent evidentiary requirement for proving the element of specific intent in attempt crimes. It establishes that a violent act within a commercial setting, even when committed with a dangerous weapon, is not by itself sufficient to infer an intent to rob. The decision forces prosecutors to provide more concrete evidence of the defendant's intent to steal, such as verbal demands, attempts to access a cash register, or other actions clearly indicating a purpose of theft. This reinforces the critical distinction between property crimes involving violence (like robbery) and crimes of pure violence (like battery or assault), preventing the conflation of the two based solely on the location of the offense.
