State v. Stone
316 A.2d 196, 1974 N.H. LEXIS 220, 114 N.H. 114 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
Under the New Hampshire Controlled Drug Act, the term "sale" is interpreted broadly to include any participation in a drug transaction that effectuates the transfer of a controlled substance, regardless of whether the participant makes a profit or acts as an agent for the buyer.
Facts:
- Daniel Perria, an undercover police agent, met the defendant, Stone, and asked where he could obtain LSD.
- Stone informed Perria that LSD could be obtained from David Piper and directed Perria to Piper's home.
- Stone told Perria that the price was two dollars per tablet.
- Perria gave Stone four dollars to purchase two tablets of LSD.
- Stone was the only person to exit the car; he entered Piper's house and returned a few minutes later.
- Stone handed two tablets of LSD to Perria.
- Stone explained that Piper would not sell directly to Perria because Piper only dealt with people he knew.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of New Hampshire indicted Stone, charging him with selling a controlled drug.
- A trial was held before a jury in the trial court.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Stone guilty of the offense charged.
- The trial court sentenced Stone to a term in the state prison.
- Stone appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, taking exception to the trial court's jury instructions.
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Issue:
Does a person who acts as a procuring agent for a buyer of a controlled substance, without making a profit, commit the act of 'selling' that substance in violation of the New Hampshire Controlled Drug Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Lampron, J.
Yes, a person who acts as a procuring agent for a buyer of a controlled substance commits the act of 'selling' under the state's drug act. The court reasoned that the definition of 'sale' in the Controlled Drug Act (RSA ch. 318-B) is intentionally broad and not limited to the narrow commercial definition found in the Uniform Commercial Code. The statute defines 'sale' to include 'barter, exchange or gift, or offer therefor' by any person, whether acting as a 'principal, proprietor, servant or employee.' The manifest legislative objective of the statute is to regulate all aspects of controlled drug distribution. Therefore, proof that the defendant made no profit or was merely a procuring agent for the buyer does not preclude his actions from constituting a sale, as his involvement brought about the transfer of the drug.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the scope of criminal liability for selling controlled substances in New Hampshire by rejecting the 'procuring agent' defense. The court's interpretation ensures that individuals who act as intermediaries or facilitators in drug transactions can be prosecuted for 'selling' just as the principal dealer would be. This holding lowers the burden for prosecutors, who do not need to prove that the defendant profited from the transaction or was acting on behalf of the original source of the drugs. The case establishes a strong precedent that focuses on the act of facilitating the transfer of drugs, rather than on the defendant's specific role or financial gain.
