State v. Sterling
376 So.2d 103 (1979)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant's constitutional right to a preliminary examination in a Louisiana felony case is satisfied when the state offers no evidence of probable cause, as the primary purpose of such an examination is to determine probable cause for detention, not to compel the state to present its case or to screen the validity of the prosecution itself.
Facts:
- On April 12, 1979, Herschel Sterling allegedly committed the felony crime of aggravated battery.
- On May 2, 1979, Sterling was charged by bill of information for aggravated battery.
- On May 11, 1979, Sterling received a preliminary examination in the magistrate court.
- At the magistrate court hearing, the state presented no evidence of probable cause but conceded Sterling's right to be released from custody without bail.
- The magistrate, finding no probable cause, released Sterling from custody without bail, though the state indicated its intent to proceed with the prosecution.
- Sterling filed a second motion for a preliminary examination in the criminal district court, contending he was entitled to a proper hearing under the Louisiana Constitution.
- On June 8, 1979, a preliminary examination was held in the district court, and the state again presented no evidence of probable cause.
Procedural Posture:
- Herschel Sterling was charged by bill of information on May 2, 1979, for aggravated battery in Louisiana.
- On Sterling's motion, a preliminary examination was held before the magistrate court on May 11, 1979.
- The magistrate, finding no probable cause after the state presented no evidence, released Sterling from custody without bail.
- Sterling filed a second motion for a preliminary examination in the criminal district court.
- On June 8, 1979, a preliminary examination was held in the criminal district court, where the state again presented no evidence of probable cause.
- The district judge ruled that the state must produce witnesses at the preliminary examination to fully satisfy Sterling's constitutional right to a preliminary examination.
- The State of Louisiana, as relator, was granted an application to review the correctness of the district judge's ruling by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the state's failure to present witnesses or evidence of probable cause at a preliminary examination, while conceding the defendant's release from custody, violate the defendant's constitutional right to a preliminary examination under the Louisiana Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Marcus, J.
No, the state's failure to present witnesses or evidence of probable cause at a preliminary examination, while conceding the defendant's release from custody, does not violate the defendant's constitutional right to a preliminary examination because the primary purpose of the examination is to determine probable cause for detention, not to compel the state to present its case for prosecution. The court explained that La.Const. art. 1, § 14 (1974) grants the right to a preliminary examination in felony cases unless indicted by a grand jury. La.Code Crim.P. art. 294 states the state may produce witnesses, and art. 296 defines the scope as determining probable cause for custody or bail. If no probable cause is found, the defendant is ordered released from custody or bail. This release, however, does not dismiss the pending charge, nor does it preclude subsequent prosecution (La.Code Crim.P. art. 386). Citing Gerstein v. Pugh, the court noted that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause only as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty, not a review of the decision to prosecute. Therefore, when the state offers no evidence and the defendant is released from custody or bail, the constitutional right to a preliminary examination—aimed at determining probable cause for detention—is fully satisfied, and the defendant has no cause to complain. The trial judge erred in requiring the state to produce witnesses.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Tate, J.
Yes, the state's tactic of presenting no evidence, even if it leads to the defendant's release from bail, improperly aborts the accused's broader constitutional right to a preliminary examination, which serves more purposes than merely securing release from custody. Justice Tate concurred with the majority that the state is not under a duty to produce witnesses, acknowledging that failure to do so results in release without bail. However, he dissented from the majority's conclusion that this fully satisfies the constitutional right. He argued that the preliminary examination has a broader function, as implicit in the constitutional guarantee (La.Const. of 1974, Art. 1, Section 14) and explicit in statutory provisions (La.C.Cr.P. art. 294, 295). These provisions, which allow both sides to produce and cross-examine witnesses and require a transcript, serve purposes beyond mere detention determination, such as protecting against shifting testimony, preserving favorable testimony, and screening cases to prevent unwarranted prosecutions (citing Thies v. State). While Gerstein v. Pugh sets a minimal Fourth Amendment standard for detention, Louisiana's constitutional and statutory framework provides for a "full-blown adversary proceeding" (State v. Jenkins) that is more robust. Even though a discharge after preliminary examination doesn't bar subsequent prosecution (La.C.Cr.P. art. 386), the hearing still forces the state to examine its case and potentially influence dismissal, a crucial screening function that should not be circumvented by simply conceding no probable cause for detention. He believed the trial court was correct that the state could not abort the right to a full examination, even if the defense had to call its own witnesses.
Analysis:
This case narrows the interpretation of the constitutional right to a preliminary examination in Louisiana, aligning its primary purpose with the Fourth Amendment's concern for probable cause in detention rather than as a robust tool for defense discovery or early prosecutorial screening. By allowing the state to satisfy the right simply by conceding the defendant's release, the ruling limits the practical utility of preliminary examinations as adversarial proceedings where the defense can test the state's evidence or attempt to secure an early dismissal of charges. This decision underscores a philosophical divide between courts that view preliminary examinations as primarily for custody determinations and those that see them as significant procedural safeguards for the accused and a mechanism for the early disposition of cases.
