State v. Stepniewski
105 Wis. 2d 261, 314 N.W.2d 98, 1982 Wisc. LEXIS 2490 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
For public welfare offenses established by administrative regulations, the legislature may dispense with the requirement of proving criminal intent (mens rea). A statute penalizing one who "intentionally refuses, neglects or fails to obey" a regulation can be interpreted to create strict liability for mere neglect or failure, without proof of intent.
Facts:
- Edward Malee was the president and Richard Stepniewski was a salesman for Energy Control Systems, Inc., a home improvement company.
- Stella Richlen and her daughter Terri contracted with the company through Stepniewski for home improvement work.
- The Richlens made a down payment of $4,000, which was transferred to Malee and deposited into the company's account.
- No work was ever performed under the Richlens' contract.
- Malee admitted to using a portion of the Richlens' down payment money to make a charitable contribution to the Boy Scouts, an act not authorized by the contract or the Richlens.
- In several other home improvement contracts, Malee and Stepniewski failed to state in writing the projects' starting and completion dates.
- In other instances where dates were included in contracts, the defendants failed to begin or complete the projects by those dates.
- The failure to complete work on two homes resulted in severe damage to the properties when winter arrived.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Wisconsin charged Edward Malee and Richard Stepniewski in trial court with theft by contractor and multiple violations of home improvement trade practice regulations.
- Following a trial to the court, the trial judge found both defendants guilty.
- The defendants appealed their convictions to the court of appeals.
- The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
- The defendants subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Does the word 'intentionally' in sec. 100.26(3), Stats. 1977, which penalizes a person who 'intentionally refuses, neglects or fails to obey any regulation,' modify all three subsequent verbs, thereby requiring the state to prove a defendant's mens rea for any charged violation under the statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Steinmetz, J.
No. The word 'intentionally' in sec. 100.26(3) modifies only the verb 'refuses' and does not apply to 'neglects' or 'fails,' meaning the state does not need to prove intent for violations based on neglect or failure. The court reasoned that the statute creates a 'public welfare offense,' a category of regulatory crimes where the legislature can dispense with the traditional requirement of proving a guilty mind (mens rea) to protect the public. By analyzing the grammar, the court concluded that 'intentionally' was used to clarify that 'refuses' means a deliberate determination not to act, while 'neglects' and 'fails' cover lesser forms of non-compliance, such as carelessness or simple failure to perform. Citing precedents like Morissette v. United States, the court affirmed that for such offenses, which heighten the duties of those in particular industries affecting public welfare, the act itself can constitute the crime. The due process challenge was rejected because the statute provides for judicial discretion in sentencing, distinguishing it from cases where a mandatory harsh penalty for a strict liability crime might be problematic.
Dissenting - Abrahamson, J.
Yes. The word 'intentionally' should be construed to modify all three verbs—'refuses,' 'neglects,' and 'fails'—requiring the state to prove mens rea for any conviction under the statute. The dissent argues that the presumption of mens rea is a cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence and should not be discarded lightly. It analyzes several factors, concluding they all favor requiring intent: the statutory language is ambiguous and can be read to require intent; the legislative history suggests an intent to add, not remove, a mens rea requirement; and most critically, the severity of the potential penalty (up to one year in jail) is too harsh for a strict liability offense where a person could be imprisoned for blameless conduct. The dissent contends that the primary purpose of this statute is to punish wrongdoers for conduct akin to fraud, not merely to regulate, and that the state has ample civil remedies for enforcement without resorting to criminal prosecution for unintentional violations. Finally, the dissent criticizes the majority for ignoring the significant due process concerns raised by imposing imprisonment without proof of fault.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the validity of the 'public welfare offense' doctrine, which allows legislatures to impose strict criminal liability for violations of regulatory statutes designed to protect the public. By narrowly interpreting the scope of the adverb 'intentionally,' the court made it easier for prosecutors to secure convictions for consumer protection violations without the burden of proving a defendant's state of mind. The ruling signals that businesses and individuals in regulated industries are held to a high standard of care, where failure to comply with administrative rules can result in criminal penalties, including imprisonment, even for unintentional acts. The case serves as a key example of the tension between the traditional criminal law principle of mens rea and the modern state's objective of effective public regulation.
