State v. Stasio

The Supreme Court of New Jersey
78 N.J. 467, 396 A.2d 1129 (1979)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge as it cannot negate a required element of intent, except in the limited circumstance where it is used to show that a defendant did not engage in the premeditation and deliberation necessary for a first-degree murder conviction.

Facts:

On October 7, 1975, Robert Colburn and Stasio were at the Silver Moon Tavern.
Stasio drank with Colburn from approximately 11:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m., at which point Stasio left.
According to Colburn, Stasio did not appear intoxicated when he left.
Stasio returned to the tavern at approximately 5:40 p.m., approached the bartender, Peter Klimek, and demanded money.
When Klimek refused, Stasio went behind the bar, threatened him, and demanded $80 from the cash register.
Stasio then produced a knife, prompting Klimek and Colburn to subdue him, causing him to drop the weapon.
The bartender, the other patron, and the arresting police officer all testified that Stasio walked and spoke in a normal manner and did not appear to be drunk.

Procedural Posture:

Stasio was charged in a New Jersey trial court with assault with intent to rob and assault while armed with a dangerous knife.
In an unrecorded conference, the trial court judge ruled that he would not instruct the jury that voluntary intoxication could serve as a defense.
Relying on this ruling, Stasio elected not to testify in his own defense.
The jury convicted Stasio on both counts.
Stasio, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division, the state's intermediate appellate court.
The Appellate Division reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding the trial court's ruling was erroneous because intoxication could negate the specific intent to rob.
The State, as petitioner, was granted its petition for certification to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the state's highest court.

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Issue:

Does voluntary intoxication constitute a defense to a crime that requires a specific intent, such as assault with intent to rob, by negating that element of the offense?

Opinions:

Majority - Schreiber, J.

No. Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to a crime requiring a specific intent. The court holds that public policy demands that a person who voluntarily becomes intoxicated should not be insulated from criminal liability for their actions. The court rejects the distinction between 'specific' and 'general' intent as an unworkable and elusive dichotomy that leads to incongruous results. Relying on the reasoning in State v. Maik, the court finds that the requisite culpability can be found in the defendant's act of voluntarily inducing intoxication. The only recognized exceptions where intoxication evidence is relevant are to disprove the premeditation and deliberation required for first-degree murder, to show a fixed state of insanity resulting from intoxication, or to establish that a defendant was in such a stupor they were physically incapable of committing the criminal act.

Concurring - Handler, J.

No. While the defendant's intoxication in this case was insufficient to negate his clear criminal purpose, intoxication should be a valid defense if it is so extreme as to deprive the defendant of the will to act. This opinion agrees with the majority's rejection of the confusing specific/general intent distinction, but argues against a near-total ban on the intoxication defense. The proper inquiry should be whether the defendant's mental state, as affected by intoxication, negates the required mens rea or volition for the crime. In this case, Stasio's actions of brandishing a knife while demanding money were clearly volitional and purposeful, so the defense would fail on the facts. The concurrence agrees that a new trial is warranted because the trial court’s procedural error improperly induced the defendant not to testify.

Concurring in result only and dissenting - Pashman, J.

Yes. Voluntary intoxication should be a defense whenever it negates a required mental element of an offense. The majority's holding defies logic by allowing a defendant to be convicted of a crime requiring a specific 'intent' when the defendant, due to intoxication, never actually possessed that intent. The opinion argues that the majority misreads precedent and that the high standard for the defense—requiring a complete 'prostration of the faculties'—is a sufficient safeguard against abuse. This dissent advocates for adopting the approach of the new New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, which permits intoxication to negate the mental states of 'purpose' or 'knowledge.' While concurring in the result that a new trial is required, this opinion dissents from the majority's entire legal reasoning regarding the intoxication defense.

Analysis:

This case significantly narrowed the availability of the voluntary intoxication defense in New Jersey, moving away from the traditional specific versus general intent analysis. It established a strong public policy rationale that prioritizes public safety over a defendant's subjective state of mind when that state is self-induced. The decision solidified the rule that, outside of negating the specific elements of first-degree murder, intoxication is generally not an excuse for criminal conduct. This holding placed New Jersey common law at odds with the more defendant-friendly approach of the Model Penal Code and the state's own new Criminal Code, which was set to become effective shortly after the decision.

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