State v. Spigarolo
1989 Conn. LEXIS 66, 210 Conn. 359, 556 A.2d 112 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute allowing the videotaped testimony of child sexual abuse victims, taken outside the defendant's physical presence, is constitutional under the Confrontation Clause if the trial court makes individualized findings by clear and convincing evidence that the child would be so intimidated as to seriously compromise the trustworthiness of their testimony; furthermore, both lay and expert testimony may be admitted to establish this necessity and to explain general behavioral patterns of child victims regarding inconsistencies without usurping the jury's role in assessing specific credibility.
Facts:
- William M. Spigarolo was the boyfriend of F (the victims' mother) and frequently visited and stayed overnight at their Hamden apartment between August and December 1984.
- Spigarolo allegedly engaged in numerous sexual activities with F's children, B (six years old) and G (nine years old), sometimes with F's assistance, on various dates between October 1984 and January 3, 1985.
- In October 1984, school officials observed B exhibiting sexually inappropriate behavior, leading to the initial disclosures of the alleged incidents.
- From December 1984 through August 1985, B and G disclosed details of the incidents in a series of interviews with social workers and police, and in discussions with their father, J, and his current wife, A.
- B and G were placed in temporary custody with J and A in January 1985, and during this period, their disclosures were at times incomplete and inconsistent, with G even recanting previous statements on one occasion in December 1985.
- Both B and G stated at various times that they were afraid to report the incidents due to fear of reprisal from Spigarolo or their mother.
- A medical test performed on G in December 1984 disclosed the presence of gonorrhea in her throat, though a subsequent test was negative, which the state presented testimony to show did not invalidate the first result.
- During the trial of F (the children's mother) for similar allegations in late 1985, G became aware of F's presence from an adjacent room, became 'totally upset,' crouched down, trembled, and shook, and B also ran from the room and tried to hide behind his father.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, William M. Spigarolo, was charged with several criminal offenses, including sexual assault and risk of injury, stemming from allegations of sexually abusing his girlfriend’s children.
- The state filed a motion to have the minor victims’ testimony taken on videotape outside the defendant’s physical presence pursuant to General Statutes § 54-86g.
- On January 6, 1986, the trial court conducted a hearing and subsequently granted the state’s motion.
- The videotaped testimony of both minor victims was admitted into evidence at the defendant’s trial.
- A jury found William M. Spigarolo guilty of two counts of sexual assault in the second degree and four counts of risk of injury to a minor.
- On March 3, 1986, Spigarolo appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of guilty rendered on the verdict.
- The appeal was subsequently transferred to the Connecticut Supreme Court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court then remanded the case, directing the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether its use of the videotape procedure under § 54-86g comported with the criteria set forth in State v. Jarzbek.
- After conducting the evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial court, on April 11, 1988, issued a memorandum of decision concluding that the state had satisfied the Jarzbek criteria.
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Issue:
1. Does General Statutes § 54-86g, which permits videotaped child testimony outside a defendant's physical presence, violate the Confrontation Clause of the state and federal constitutions when applied with individualized findings of necessity? 2. Did the trial court err by admitting non-expert opinion testimony regarding victim intimidation, qualified expert testimony on general child sexual abuse victim behavior, and by its rulings on the specificity of charges and jury unanimity instructions?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Glass
No, General Statutes § 54-86g does not violate the Confrontation Clause, nor did the trial court err in its evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, under the circumstances presented. The court affirmed the constitutionality of General Statutes § 54-86g, which allows for videotaped child testimony outside the defendant's physical presence. It clarified, consistent with State v. Snook, that the trial court's discretion under this statute is "circumscribed by the criteria established in State v. Jarzbek." This means an individualized evidentiary hearing is constitutionally required to determine if the child would be so intimidated by the defendant's presence that the trustworthiness of their testimony would be seriously called into question. The court further held that these Jarzbek standards are consistent with Coy v. Iowa, which did not establish an absolute right to face-to-face confrontation and recognized that exceptions may exist to further important public policies, such as the search for truth in criminal trials. Regarding the evidentiary claims, the court found no error in the trial court's admission of lay witness opinions from the victims' father (J) and his wife (A) at the Jarzbek remand hearing. The court reasoned that non-expert witnesses may provide opinions on another's mental or emotional state if reliable and based on sufficient personal observations, particularly in child abuse cases where family members hold a unique position to assess a child's emotional impact. The court explicitly rejected the argument that Jarzbek requires expert testimony. Furthermore, it noted that lay opinion on "ultimate issues" is admissible when it aids the trier of fact in making intelligent findings, such as a victim's truthfulness when facing the accused. The court also concluded that the trial court's finding, based on this evidence, that the Jarzbek criteria were met, was not clearly erroneous. On the admissibility of expert testimony, the court held that the trial court properly allowed a social worker to testify generally about the behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse victims, specifically that it is not unusual for them to give inconsistent or incomplete stories. This expert testimony is admissible when the defense has sought to impeach the victim's credibility based on such inconsistencies, as the consequences of this trauma are beyond the understanding of the average person and assist the jury in assessing credibility. Crucially, the court stressed the distinction between admissible general expert testimony on typical behavior patterns and inadmissible testimony directly opining on the credibility of the specific victims, thereby preserving the jury's function. Addressing the due process claim regarding notice, the court found no error in the state's use of "divers dates" for the offenses. The Sixth Amendment requires sufficient precision to prepare a defense and avoid surprise, but the state is not obligated to provide information it does not possess. Given the young age of the victims and the nature of the alleged continuous abuse, providing exact dates would have been futile. The overall information provided in the charges and disclosures was deemed sufficient, and the defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. Finally, the court concluded that the jury instructions on unanimity for the risk of injury counts and on the effect of prior felony convictions were not erroneous. The various sexual acts alleged under the risk of injury counts were not "conceptually distinct" within the meaning of Gipson and Bailey, as they involved harmful sexual activity as a continuing offense, thus not requiring a specific unanimity instruction. The instruction that prior felony convictions affect credibility but do not disqualify a witness was also deemed correct, as it emphasized that the jury should not disregard testimony solely on that basis while still considering it for credibility.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark decision clarifying the delicate balance between a defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and the protection of child sexual abuse victims. It affirms the constitutionality of statutory provisions for alternative testimony methods (like videotape) when coupled with stringent, individualized judicial findings of necessity. By allowing both lay and expert testimony to establish victim intimidation and explain common behavioral patterns, the court provides critical tools for prosecutors while carefully limiting expert testimony to general patterns, thus safeguarding the jury's role in assessing specific witness credibility. The rulings on notice and jury unanimity also offer crucial guidance for charging and instructing juries in complex child abuse cases involving continuous or unspecific timelines.
