State v. Sowell
728 A.2d 712 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
In Maryland, the common law distinction between a principal and an accessory before the fact remains valid, meaning a conviction as a principal requires the state to prove the defendant's actual or constructive presence at the scene of the crime.
Facts:
- Brian Lamont Sowell was an employee of Recycling Incorporated.
- On October 17, 1995, Sowell called the office manager to confirm that the company payroll would be distributed in cash that day.
- Sowell picked up his own pay in cash at approximately 12:30 p.m.
- About an hour later, three armed men robbed the Recycling Incorporated office, stealing $14,600 in cash.
- Testimony from a co-conspirator revealed Sowell was the mastermind who planned the robbery, provided a map, and instructed the others on when to act.
- Sowell explicitly told his co-conspirators that he would be on his work route during the robbery to establish an alibi.
- Just before the robbery, Sowell drove by the other men, told them to "go ahead," and then drove away from the area and out of sight.
- The day after the robbery, Sowell met with the perpetrators to split the stolen money, remarking that the robbery "was easy, just like he had planned."
Procedural Posture:
- Brian Lamont Sowell was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (trial court of first instance) of armed robbery, robbery, use of a handgun, and first degree assault.
- Sowell, as appellant, appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Special Appeals reversed Sowell's convictions, finding the evidence was insufficient to prove he was present, actually or constructively, at the crime scene.
- The State of Maryland, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court) to review the decision.
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Issue:
Does the common law distinction between a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact, which requires proof of the defendant's actual or constructive presence to be convicted as a principal, remain valid in Maryland?
Opinions:
Majority - Cathell, J.
No, the common law distinction between a principal and an accessory before the fact remains valid in Maryland, and a defendant cannot be convicted as a principal without proof of actual or constructive presence at the crime scene. Although Maryland is the only state to retain this distinction, the court deferred to the legislature to abrogate such a long-standing common law doctrine, noting that other states have abolished it legislatively, not judicially. The court has only abrogated certain procedural rules related to accessoryship, not the substantive distinction itself. Applying this rule, the evidence was insufficient to convict Sowell as a principal because he was not constructively present. Constructive presence requires being close enough to render aid during the crime, but the evidence showed Sowell purposefully absented himself from the scene to create an alibi, making him an accessory before the fact, not a principal in the second degree.
Concurring - Raker, J.
Yes, the common law distinction between a principal and an accessory before the fact should be abolished because it is an outdated, hyper-technical rule that thwarts justice. While agreeing that the evidence was insufficient under current Maryland law, this opinion argues that the Court should have taken the opportunity to change the law itself. The historical reason for the rule—mitigating the death penalty for all felonies—has long since vanished. Because the common law created this 'technical monster,' the judiciary has the power and duty to correct it rather than wait for a legislature that has shown no inclination to address it.
Concurring - Wilner, J.
Yes, the distinction is an anachronism that should be abolished, but the fact that all other states have done so legislatively gives pause. This opinion agrees that the rule serves no useful purpose but expresses hesitation for the court to act unilaterally. It suggests that the legislature has not acted simply because it has been preoccupied with other matters. The opinion urges the relevant legislative committee to formally consider the issue and make a recommendation to the General Assembly, allowing the court to be guided by the legislature's subsequent action or inaction.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms Maryland's unique status as the only U.S. jurisdiction to retain the strict common law distinction between principals and accessories. It highlights the court's principle of judicial restraint, deferring to the legislature on significant changes to deep-rooted common law doctrines, even when they are widely viewed as archaic. The case serves as a critical lesson for prosecutors in Maryland on the importance of proper charging; a defendant who masterminds a crime but is not present cannot be convicted as a principal. The strong concurrences signal that the doctrine's days may be numbered, either through future judicial action or, more likely, legislative reform prompted by the court's opinions.
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