State v. Smith
229 S.W.3d 85, 2007 WL 654248 (2007)
Rule of Law:
A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense in an accomplice liability case if there is an evidentiary basis for the jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense and convict them of the lesser, particularly when evidence suggests the accomplice did not act with the purpose to promote an aggravating factor (e.g., use of a deadly weapon) that distinguishes a higher degree of the crime.
Facts:
- On August 21, 2002, Derrick Smith drove James Scott in Mia Wilson's Saturn to a Wal-Mart, where Scott purchased .22 caliber ammunition after Smith conversed with a cashier in the sporting goods department.
- Later that day, Smith drove Scott in the Saturn past Christopher Brooks near 20th and McKinley Street in Lexington, Missouri.
- Around 1:00 p.m., Scott entered Harold's Supermarket, approached cashier Patricia Ratcliff and manager Nancy Caldwell, and using a gun, forced Caldwell to open the safe and took money.
- After the robbery, Scott quickly exited the store, and Christopher Brooks observed a dark Saturn with two occupants drive away.
- Scott and Smith drove the Saturn to Sharon Mason’s apartment, where Smith used the restroom.
- The Saturn was later located by police at the Garden Apartments and identified by Christopher Brooks as the vehicle used in the robbery.
- Sharon Mason's maintenance man, Chris Small, observed Scott and Smith exiting Mason's apartment through the back door and saw Smith hide something under landscaping rocks before police apprehended Smith.
- Police found a gun and baseball cap hidden under mulch, $5,087 in cash under landscaping rocks, and a Bank Midwest bag with cash and checks from Harold's in Mason's refrigerator; a Bank Midwest money-band was found among Smith's possessions at the jail.
Procedural Posture:
- On September 30, 2002, Derrick Smith was indicted in the Circuit Court of Lafayette County as a prior and persistent offender on one count of first-degree robbery and one count of armed criminal action (ACA) for the robbery of Harold’s Supermarket.
- On August 27, 2003, Smith's case proceeded to a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Lafayette County, where he was found guilty on both counts on August 28, 2003.
- Smith appealed his convictions to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which, on February 1, 2005, reversed his convictions and remanded for a new trial due to plain error in instructing the jury on note-taking (State v. Smith, 154 S.W.3d 461 (Mo.App.2005)).
- Smith’s second trial began on August 17, 2005, in the Circuit Court of Lafayette County, during which his motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s and all of the evidence were overruled.
- On August 28, 2005, the jury in the second trial found Smith guilty of both first-degree robbery and ACA.
- On September 6, 2005, Smith filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which was denied by the Circuit Court on September 19, 2005.
- On October 3, 2005, Smith was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for first-degree robbery and fifty years for ACA.
- Smith, as the appellant, appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Lafayette County to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by refusing to instruct a jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree robbery in an accomplice liability case when there is an evidentiary basis for the jury to reasonably infer that the accomplice did not know the principal would use a deadly weapon, which distinguishes first-degree from second-degree robbery?
Opinions:
Majority - Edwin H. Smith
Yes, a trial court errs by refusing to instruct a jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree robbery in an accomplice liability case when there is an evidentiary basis for the jury to reasonably infer that the accomplice did not know the principal would use a deadly weapon. The court explained that under Missouri law, a trial court is obligated to instruct on a lesser-included offense if there is an evidentiary basis for a jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense and convict them of the lesser, and robbery in the second degree is a lesser-included offense of robbery in the first degree, distinguished by the display or threat of a deadly weapon. For accomplice liability, the State must prove that the accomplice acted "with the purpose of promoting the commission of an offense" (§ 562.041.1(2)). While the general rule is that an accomplice shares the principal's intent if they purposely promote the underlying offense (citing State v. White and State v. Roberts), § 562.051 permits differing degrees of liability when an offense is divided into degrees, based on each person's culpable mental state regarding aggravating or mitigating factors. This means an accomplice's liability may not be the same degree as the principal's if the accomplice did not have the purpose or conscious object of aiding in the commission of the particular degree of the underlying offense. The court found that the evidence could reasonably support an inference that Smith did not know Scott would use a gun in the robbery. Although Smith was present when Scott purchased ammunition, there was no direct evidence he witnessed the purchase, discussed a gun with Scott, or saw the gun before or after the robbery. Therefore, a reasonable juror could have inferred that Smith acted with the purpose of promoting a robbery but not specifically one involving a deadly weapon, thus acquitting him of first-degree robbery and convicting him of second-degree robbery. The court explicitly rejected prior interpretations from State v. Neal and England v. State that required a dual intent for accomplices (purpose to promote plus the underlying crime's culpable mental state), reaffirming the White and Roberts interpretation that only the purpose to promote the principal's conduct constituting the offense is required, but this purpose must extend to the specific degree of the offense. The failure to instruct on second-degree robbery was reversible error, and the conviction for armed criminal action was also reversed due to its reliance on the underlying robbery conviction.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the mens rea requirement for accomplice liability in Missouri, particularly for offenses with multiple degrees. It reinforces the notion that an accomplice is not automatically liable for the highest degree of a crime if evidence suggests they did not share the principal's intent regarding the specific aggravating factors that define that higher degree. This ruling will likely lead to more frequent requests for lesser-included offense instructions in accomplice cases where the aggravating element, such as weapon use, is disputed for the accomplice's knowledge or intent. It places a greater burden on the prosecution to prove the accomplice's specific intent for each element of the higher-degree offense, rather than simply proving intent to participate in a general criminal enterprise.
