State v. Smith
146 Ariz. 491, 707 P.2d 289, 64 A.L.R. 4th 809 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
An in-court identification is admissible, even if it follows an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure, provided that under the totality of the circumstances the identification is reliable.
Facts:
- On August 21, 1983, Bernard Smith entered the Low Cost Market, demanded money from the clerk, Charles Pray, and then shot Pray when he did not immediately comply.
- Smith took the money from the cash register and fled the store. Pray later died from the gunshot wound.
- Ellen Foster and her sister, who were in the parking lot, heard the gunshot, saw Smith leaving, and followed him in their car.
- Smith pointed a gun at Foster and her sister, told them to go, and then drove away. They reported his license plate number to the police.
- On the way to the police station for an identification, Officer Skaggs told Foster that the police had "caught the man" and had found the gun in his car.
- At the station, police conducted three successive show-ups where Smith was presented to Foster for identification.
- After the third show-up, during which Smith was made to turn and face her, Foster positively identified him as the man from the market.
Procedural Posture:
- Bernard Smith was charged with first degree murder and armed robbery in an Arizona trial court.
- Before trial, Smith filed a motion to suppress Ellen Foster's identification testimony, arguing it was tainted by an unduly suggestive police procedure.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
- Following a jury trial, Smith was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery.
- The trial judge sentenced Smith to death for the murder and life imprisonment for the robbery.
- Smith appealed his convictions and sentences directly to the Supreme Court of Arizona.
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Issue:
Does the admission of an in-court identification, following a pretrial identification procedure that was unduly suggestive, violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights if the identification is otherwise deemed reliable?
Opinions:
Majority - Feldman, Justice.
No, the admission of the in-court identification does not violate the defendant's due process rights because the identification was reliable despite the suggestive pretrial procedure. The court acknowledged the state's concession that the combination of Officer Skaggs' pre-identification comments and the triple show-up was unduly suggestive. However, an unduly suggestive procedure does not automatically require suppression if the identification is nonetheless reliable. Applying the five-factor test from Neil v. Biggers, the court found the identification reliable because: (1) Foster had a sufficient opportunity to view Smith, including a full-face view when he threatened her; (2) her attention was fully fixed on him; (3) her prior description was sufficiently accurate; (4) her initial caution before making a positive identification did not undermine her ultimate certainty; and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation was very short (about 30 minutes). Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the principle that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. It demonstrates that even significant procedural flaws by law enforcement, such as suggestive comments and repeated show-ups, do not automatically lead to the suppression of an identification. The decision solidifies the two-step analytical framework: first, determine if the procedure was unduly suggestive, and if so, second, assess whether the identification is independently reliable under the Neil v. Biggers factors. This puts a heavy burden on the defense to show not only that the police procedure was suggestive, but also that it created a 'very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,' which is difficult to prove if the witness's original opportunity to observe was strong.
