State v. Smith
621 A.2d 493, 262 N.J. Super. 487 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Under New Jersey's criminal attempt statute, a defendant is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if they purposely engage in conduct they subjectively believe will cause the criminal result, regardless of whether that result is factually or scientifically impossible to achieve.
Facts:
- Gregory Dean Smith was an inmate at the Camden County jail and was aware that he was infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
- On several occasions prior to June 11, 1989, Smith threatened corrections officers, stating he would kill them by biting or spitting on them.
- On June 11, 1989, Smith was taken to a hospital where he became disruptive after doctors determined he had no serious injuries.
- Corrections Officers Snow and Waddington attempted to subdue Smith to transport him back to jail.
- During the struggle, Smith repeatedly threatened to bite the officers and give them AIDS so they would die.
- Smith then bit Officer Waddington on the hand, causing several puncture wounds that drew blood.
- Immediately after the bite and while being transported, Smith spit at Waddington and said, "now die, you pig, die from what I have."
- Smith later claimed he believed it was impossible to transmit HIV through a bite, citing conversations with a jail mental health worker.
Procedural Posture:
- Gregory Dean Smith was indicted by a grand jury on charges including attempted murder of Officer Waddington, aggravated assault, and terroristic threats.
- The case was tried before a jury in a New Jersey trial court.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict against Smith on the charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault on Waddington, and terroristic threats.
- The trial judge sentenced Smith to an aggregate prison term of 25 years with a 12.5-year period of parole ineligibility.
- Smith, as the appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
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Issue:
Does a defendant commit attempted murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(2) if he purposely engages in conduct that he subjectively believes will cause death, even if it is medically or factually impossible for that conduct to cause the intended result?
Opinions:
Majority - King, P.J.A.D.
Yes. A defendant is guilty of attempted murder if he purposely intends to cause death and has done all that he believes is necessary to cause that result, regardless of whether his chosen method was objectively likely to succeed. The New Jersey criminal attempt statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, provides three independent categories of attempt. Subsection (a)(2), under which this case was charged, focuses solely on the defendant's subjective purpose and does not incorporate the 'reasonable person' standard found in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3). This provision was specifically designed to eliminate the defense of legal or factual impossibility for result-oriented offenses. The jury had ample evidence, including Smith's repeated threats and statements, to conclude that he subjectively believed his bite could be fatal and acted with the purpose of killing Officer Waddington. The jury was free to reject Smith's self-serving testimony that he knew transmission was impossible, and the objective scientific probability of HIV transmission via a bite is irrelevant to liability under this subsection of the statute.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that for criminal attempts to cause a specific result under N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(2), the legal analysis is purely subjective, focusing entirely on the defendant's state of mind. The decision establishes that a defendant cannot use factual or scientific impossibility as a defense if they believed their actions could achieve the criminal objective. This precedent is significant in cases involving unconventional or scientifically uncertain means of harm, shifting the focus from the efficacy of the method to the actor's criminal purpose and conduct.
