State v. Sjogren
494 P.3d 1040, 313 Or.App. 364 (2021)
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Rule of Law:
To qualify as a 'building' under Oregon's burglary statute (ORS 164.215), a structure must be 'more or less completely enclosed by walls' under both its ordinary meaning and its expanded definition; if qualifying under the expanded definition, it must also have been 'adapted' for a new or different use for carrying on business or overnight accommodation.
Facts:
- John Alan Sjogren was seen by surveillance cameras taking garbage from a garbage pit located in the center of the Coos County Solid Waste Facility.
- The garbage pit is 10- to 15-feet deep with concrete walls supporting its below-ground portion.
- Above ground, the garbage pit has no walls, only several pillars that support a sheet metal roof covering the contents in the pit.
- Other than the support pillars, the area between the roof and the ground is exposed.
- The pit’s features, such as fortified walls, a roof, a curb, and posts, enable it to function consistently with its original purpose as a garbage pit.
Procedural Posture:
- John Alan Sjogren was charged with and convicted of second-degree burglary in Coos County Circuit Court (trial court).
- At trial, Sjogren moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that he did not enter a 'building' as required by the burglary statute.
- The trial court denied Sjogren's motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding the pit qualified as a 'building'.
- Sjogren appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of Oregon, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion and the receipt of a nonunanimous jury verdict.
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Issue:
Does a covered garbage pit, which has below-ground concrete walls but no above-ground walls, qualify as a 'building' under ORS 164.215(1) for the purposes of second-degree burglary?
Opinions:
Majority - Kamins, J.
No, a covered garbage pit with no above-ground walls does not qualify as a 'building' under ORS 164.215(1) for purposes of second-degree burglary. The court explained that for a structure to meet the 'ordinary meaning' of a 'building,' it must be 'more or less completely enclosed by walls,' which is consistent with the statutory purpose of protecting against the invasion of premises likely to terrorize occupants. The garbage pit, lacking walls above ground and being an open-air structure, does not meet this criterion (citing State v. Taylor and State v. Barker/Phelps). Furthermore, the court held that the garbage pit does not qualify under the expanded definition of 'building' in ORS 164.205(1) (which includes structures 'adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein'). This expanded definition still presupposes that a 'building' is mostly enclosed, consistent with the purpose of protecting potential 'occupants.' Crucially, for a structure to be 'adapted,' it must be made suitable 'for a new or different use or situation by means of changes or modifications' (citing State v. Nollen). The modifications made to the garbage pit, such as fortified walls and a roof, merely enable it to function consistently with its original purpose as a garbage pit, rather than for a 'new or different' use like carrying on business. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Sjogren's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court also noted a nonunanimous jury verdict, which independently necessitated reversal under Ramos v. Louisiana.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the interpretation of 'building' under Oregon's burglary statute, reinforcing the requirement for substantial enclosure by walls under both its ordinary and expanded definitions. It clarifies that merely enhancing a structure for its original purpose does not constitute 'adapting' it for a new use under the expanded definition. This strict interpretation will likely reduce the scope of structures that can be subject to burglary charges, ensuring that the statute aligns with its original purpose of protecting against invasions likely to terrorize occupants, and potentially impacting future prosecutions involving semi-open or specialized industrial structures.
