State v. Sinclair
191 N.C. App. 485, 663 S.E.2d 866, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1473 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Fleeing from a consensual police encounter, before an officer has established reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, does not constitute the crime of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer because an individual is at liberty to disregard the police in such a situation.
Facts:
- Detective Jerry Davis had multiple prior encounters with the Defendant, including one instance of searching him at a bowling alley and another of strip-searching him at the police station, neither of which resulted in charges.
- On August 6, 2004, police officers, including Detective Davis, went to the same bowling alley, a known area for drug activity, based on a general tip about 'drug activity.'
- Detective Davis, identifiable as an officer by an embroidered badge on his shirt, approached Defendant, who was sitting with a group, called him by his nickname 'PooSack,' and said, 'let me talk to you.'
- Defendant stood up, walked towards Davis, and asked, 'Oh, you want to search me again, huh?'
- Detective Davis responded, 'Yes, sir.'
- Defendant then stated, 'Nope. Got to go,' and immediately fled across an adjacent vacant lot.
- Officers pursued and apprehended Defendant. A search of his person revealed only cigarettes and $170 in cash.
- Another officer retraced Defendant's escape route and discovered a clean, undisturbed plastic bag containing crack cocaine lying on top of the tall grass.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was indicted in Beaufort County Superior Court on charges of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, resisting a public officer, and being a habitual felon.
- At the close of evidence during the jury trial, Defendant made a motion to dismiss the charges based on insufficient evidence, which the trial court denied.
- The jury convicted Defendant of the lesser included offense of simple possession of cocaine and the charge of resisting a public officer.
- Following the verdicts, the jury found Defendant had attained the status of a habitual felon.
- The trial court sentenced Defendant to prison.
- Defendant appealed the judgment to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a person's flight from a consensual police encounter, prior to the establishment of reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, constitute resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer in the discharge of their duties?
Opinions:
Majority - Stephens, J.
No, a person's flight from a consensual police encounter does not constitute resisting a public officer because an individual is free to disregard the police and go about their business in such a situation. The encounter between Detective Davis and Defendant was consensual, as a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to ignore the police presence and leave. Davis merely approached, asked to talk, and stated his intent to search, which does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Because Defendant was free to terminate the encounter, his flight was not 'unlawful' or 'without justification or excuse,' which are essential elements of the offense of resisting a public officer. Furthermore, even if the interaction was an attempted investigatory stop, it would have been unlawful because the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion particularized to Defendant; their knowledge was limited to Defendant's presence in a high-crime area and a vague tip about drug activity. A person is entitled to resist an illegal stop or arrest, meaning the officer would not have been discharging a lawful duty of his office.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the critical distinction between a consensual encounter and a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. It establishes that flight from a purely consensual encounter cannot, by itself, form the basis for a charge of resisting a public officer. The ruling underscores that for a stop to be lawful—and thus for fleeing from it to be considered resistance—police must possess more than a generalized suspicion based on location; they need specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot involving the particular individual. This serves to protect citizens' rights to refuse to engage with law enforcement when they are not being lawfully detained.
