State v. Sinbandith
1999 N.H. LEXIS 47, 143 N.H. 579, 729 A.2d 994 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
An indictment alleging that a defendant acted "in concert with and aided by another" is legally sufficient to charge the defendant as both a principal and an accomplice. Such an indictment is not defective for alleging the "knowing" mental state required for principal liability, as it provides adequate notice to the defendant to prepare a defense for either theory.
Facts:
- In July 1996, an undercover State Police narcotics detective, Corporal Nightingale, arranged several purchases of crack cocaine from Bounleuth Sinbandith.
- On multiple occasions, Nightingale gave Sinbandith a sum of money for the drugs.
- Sinbandith would then drive to a separate location, sometimes accompanied by his girlfriend Elizabeth Begin or an associate named Velvet Weeks.
- Upon Sinbandith's return from the separate location, Velvet Weeks would hand a quantity of crack cocaine to the undercover officer.
- On one of the four occasions, Sinbandith was unable to acquire the cocaine and returned the money to Nightingale.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted Bounleuth Sinbandith on seven charges, including three for sale of a controlled drug, three for conspiracy, and one for attempt.
- The case was tried before a jury in the New Hampshire Superior Court, which is the trial court of general jurisdiction.
- At the close of the State's case, Sinbandith moved to dismiss the sale indictments, arguing they alleged the incorrect mens rea for accomplice liability. The trial court denied the motion.
- The jury convicted Sinbandith on all seven charges.
- Sinbandith (appellant) appealed his convictions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Is an indictment for the sale of a controlled drug, which alleges the defendant acted "in concert with and aided by another" and had a "knowing" mental state, legally sufficient to charge him under theories of both principal and accomplice liability, even though accomplice liability requires a "purposely" mental state?
Opinions:
Majority - Brock, C.J.
Yes. An indictment that alleges a defendant acted “in concert with and aided by another” is sufficient to charge the defendant both as a principal and as an accomplice. The court reasoned that this language has a consistently recognized legal meaning that provides sufficient notice to the defendant that he could be convicted under either theory of liability. Because the indictment validly charged Sinbandith as a principal—for which "knowingly" is the correct mental state for the underlying drug offense—it provided him with adequate notice to prepare a defense. The fact that the indictment was captioned as an accomplice charge does not override the explicit charging language in the body of the document. The court also declined to address the defendant's challenges to the jury instructions, holding that he had waived those arguments by failing to make specific and timely objections at trial.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the procedural principle that an indictment's substantive language, particularly established legal phrases like "in concert with," prevails over its caption. It solidifies the rule that such language puts a defendant on notice for both principal and accomplice liability, streamlining the charging process for prosecutors. The case also serves as a strong cautionary example of the waiver doctrine, emphasizing that appellate review is foreclosed unless a party raises specific, contemporaneous objections at the trial level that mirror the arguments made on appeal. This reinforces the need for diligent and precise trial advocacy to preserve all potential legal issues.
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