State v. Shumway
63 P.3d 94, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 2002 UT 124 (2002)
Rule of Law:
Jury instructions regarding lesser included offenses must not mandate that a jury unanimously acquit a defendant of the greater charge before considering the lesser charge, particularly when elements of the greater charge (murder) might be met alongside mitigating circumstances (manslaughter). Furthermore, a conviction for tampering with evidence cannot be sustained based solely on the speculative inference that a defendant had the opportunity to conceal a missing item.
Facts:
- Fifteen-year-old Brookes Shumway spent the night at the trailer home of his friend, fourteen-year-old Christopher Ray.
- The two boys stayed up until 5:30 a.m. playing video games, during which Christopher became irritated after losing.
- According to Brookes, as they went to bed, Christopher retrieved a kitchen knife, acted aggressively, and lunged at Brookes.
- A struggle ensued over the knife, resulting in Brookes stabbing Christopher multiple times.
- At 7:00 a.m., Brookes woke Christopher's mother, stating Christopher tried to stab him and he stabbed back; Christopher was found dead with 39 stab wounds.
- Police recovered a butcher knife at the scene, but the medical examiner later determined some wounds were likely caused by a second, smaller implement.
- Police and crime scene cleaners processed the trailer, but this alleged second weapon was never found.
- Investigators found bloody socks in a gym bag and rolled-up bloody blankets in the corner of the room.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Brookes Shumway with murder and tampering with evidence.
- The juvenile court certified Shumway to stand trial as an adult.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial in the district court.
- The jury convicted Shumway of both murder and tampering with evidence.
- Shumway appealed the convictions to the Utah Supreme Court.
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Issue:
1) Did the trial court commit reversible error by instructing the jury that they must unanimously find the defendant not guilty of murder before considering the lesser included offense of manslaughter? 2) Is the evidence sufficient to convict a defendant of evidence tampering based solely on the fact that a suspected weapon was never found and the defendant had time to hide it?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Howe
Yes, regarding the jury instruction, and No, regarding the sufficiency of the tampering evidence. The court held that the trial court erroneously mandated the order of deliberation. By instructing the jury they had to acquit on murder before considering manslaughter, the court prevented the jury from considering 'extreme emotional disturbance' manslaughter. Under Utah law, a jury can find all elements of murder are present but still convict on the lesser charge of manslaughter if the defendant acted under extreme emotional distress or imperfect self-defense. Because the evidence showed the victim might have been the aggressor and the defendant had a history of being bullied, this error was not harmless. Regarding the tampering charge, the court reasoned that the State's case relied entirely on the 'speculative leap' that because the second knife was missing and Brookes had time to hide it, he must have done so. The court found this insufficient, noting other explanations existed, such as the police missing the knife or cleaners removing it.
Analysis:
This case is significant because it reinforces the 'acquittal first' prohibition in jury instructions, ensuring that juries are free to consider lesser included offenses—specifically those based on mitigation like emotional distress—without first discarding the greater charge. It clarifies that murder and manslaughter are not always mutually exclusive in terms of elements; rather, manslaughter can exist as a mitigated form of murder even when the intent to kill is proven. Additionally, the decision sets a strict boundary on circumstantial evidence for tampering charges, establishing that mere 'opportunity' to hide evidence is insufficient for a criminal conviction without corroborating proof that the defendant actually took action to conceal it. This protects defendants from convictions based on police failure to locate items.
