State v. Shumaker
2005 WL 2810753, 914 So. 2d 1156 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A warrantless search is valid if consent is given by a third party whom police reasonably believe possesses common authority over the premises, such as a babysitter with joint access and control over the common areas. Additionally, a criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it requires a specific element of intent, thereby giving adequate notice of the proscribed conduct.
Facts:
- On April 21, 2004, Caddo Parish Sheriff's officers received a complaint about a strong ammonia smell coming from a trailer.
- Upon arrival, officers detected a strong chemical odor consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine.
- Penny Langley, who was babysitting a child at the residence, answered the door.
- Langley informed officers that she sometimes stayed at the trailer and had access to it.
- Langley gave the officers consent to search the premises.
- During the search, officers discovered numerous items associated with methamphetamine manufacturing in the kitchen, bedroom, bathroom, an abandoned trailer behind the residence, and in the yard.
- William Wayne Shumaker and Theresa Waddell arrived at the residence during the search.
- After being arrested and read his Miranda rights, Shumaker confessed to helping another individual cook methamphetamine at the location.
Procedural Posture:
- William Wayne Shumaker was charged in trial court with conspiracy to manufacture a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and creation or operation of a clandestine laboratory.
- Shumaker filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence from the search, arguing the babysitter's consent was invalid.
- The trial court conducted a hearing and denied the motion to suppress.
- Following a trial, a jury acquitted Shumaker of the conspiracy charge but convicted him of attempted creation or operation of a clandestine laboratory.
- Shumaker filed post-trial motions for a new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied.
- Shumaker appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a babysitter who has access to the common areas of a residence and occasionally stays overnight possess sufficient apparent authority to give valid consent for a warrantless search of those areas?
Opinions:
Majority - Caraway, J.
Yes, a babysitter in such circumstances has apparent authority to consent to a search of common areas. A warrantless search is permissible when consent is freely given by a person who possesses common authority or a sufficient relationship to the premises. Under United States v. Matlock, common authority rests on mutual use and joint access or control, meaning the defendant has assumed the risk that a co-inhabitant might permit a search. Even if actual authority is lacking, the search is reasonable under Illinois v. Rodriguez if the police reasonably believed the consenting person had authority. Here, Langley was the adult caretaker, had access to the entire trailer, and had stayed there often, giving her at least apparent authority over the common areas like the kitchen and bathroom where evidence was found. Furthermore, the court found the search was also justified by exigent circumstances, as the strong ammonia smell indicated the presence of volatile and potentially explosive materials associated with a methamphetamine lab, creating a clear public safety concern.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the Fourth Amendment's 'apparent authority' doctrine regarding third-party consent searches. It provides a practical application of the principles from Matlock and Rodriguez, clarifying that individuals with temporary but significant control over a property, like a babysitter, can provide valid consent for searches of common areas. The ruling underscores that the test focuses on the officers' reasonable perception of authority, not necessarily the person's actual legal right. The case also affirms a key principle of statutory interpretation: a law criminalizing the possession of otherwise legal items is not unconstitutionally vague if it includes a specific intent requirement, thereby narrowing its scope to criminal conduct.
