State v. Shock
68 Mo. 552 (1878)
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Rule of Law:
Under Missouri's felony murder statute, the predicate felony must be a collateral and independent crime from the act of personal violence that constitutes the homicide itself. An assault that is a constituent element of the killing merges with the homicide and cannot serve as the underlying felony to elevate the crime to first-degree murder.
Facts:
- The defendant, Shock, was caring for Robt. Scott, a boy between five and six years of age.
- On March 6, 1878, Shock beat Scott with a sycamore fishing-pole, which was approximately three feet long and one and a half inches in diameter.
- Shock then went into the yard, retrieved a piece of grapevine about one and a fourth inches in diameter, and returned to resume the beating.
- The entire beating lasted for approximately fifteen minutes, during which the child groaned and moaned but did not scream.
- Several days after the beating, Scott died from the injuries he had sustained.
- An inquest revealed that the child's head was covered with bruises, his back was 'beaten to a jelly,' and his skull was fractured.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree in the circuit court of Callaway county, a state trial court.
- Following a trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
- The trial court sentenced the defendant to be hanged.
- The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was implicitly denied.
- The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Missouri Supreme Court, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does an unintentional killing that occurs during the commission of an assault intended to inflict great bodily harm constitute murder in the first degree under the 'other felony' provision of the Missouri felony murder statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Hough, J.
No. A homicide committed while perpetrating an act intended only to inflict great bodily harm is not murder in the first degree under the felony murder rule. The court reasoned that the words 'other felony' in the first-degree murder statute refer to a collateral felony, like arson or robbery, and not to acts of personal violence that are necessary and constituent elements of the homicide itself. The court held that the assault which causes the death merges with the homicide and cannot be treated as a separate, predicate felony. The statute making the infliction of 'great bodily harm' a felony explicitly applies in circumstances that would constitute murder or manslaughter 'if death had ensued,' and thus is intended for non-fatal assaults. To apply it where death does ensue would create a logical contradiction, improperly converting what might be manslaughter or second-degree murder into first-degree murder. This decision overrules the contrary precedent set in State v. Jennings.
Dissenting - Norton, J.
Yes. A homicide resulting from an act intended to inflict great bodily harm should be considered murder in the first degree. The dissent argued for stare decisis, noting that the court's prior interpretation in State v. Jennings had been affirmed by subsequent legislative re-enactment of the statute without change. Under Missouri statute, inflicting great bodily harm is a felony. The plain language of the felony murder statute states that a murder committed in the perpetration of 'any... felony' is murder in the first degree. The dissent rejected the majority's 'merger' doctrine, arguing that the words 'other felony' are comprehensive and should not be judicially limited to exclude felonies involving personal violence against the victim, just as rape and robbery are not excluded.
Concurring - Henry, J.
No. The interpretation from the prior State v. Jennings case would lead to absurd results and nullify other provisions of the criminal code. For example, a statute explicitly defines causing a mother's death during an abortion as second-degree manslaughter, but under the dissent's logic, it would become first-degree murder because it occurred during a felony. The statute criminalizing the infliction of great bodily harm (§33) applies only when death does not result, and it correctly recognizes that if death did result, the crime would be graded as murder or manslaughter based on the specific circumstances, not automatically elevated to first-degree murder. The concurrence further argued that the principle of stare decisis is not as strong in criminal cases where a clear error in statutory construction has led to unjust outcomes.
Analysis:
This case establishes the 'merger doctrine' in Missouri, significantly narrowing the application of the felony murder rule. The decision prevents prosecutors from elevating a homicide to first-degree murder simply because the fatal assault itself constitutes a felony. By requiring the predicate felony to be collateral and independent from the act causing death, the court preserved the traditional grading of homicides based on the defendant's mens rea toward the killing. This ruling has a lasting impact on homicide prosecutions, ensuring that felony murder charges are reserved for killings that occur during the commission of distinct, dangerous felonies like robbery or arson, rather than being used to bootstrap lesser degrees of homicide.
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