State v. Sharpe
435 P.3d 887 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
Appellate review of Daubert/Coon determinations for scientific evidence admissibility should employ a hybrid standard, with preliminary factual findings reviewed for clear error, while the question of a scientific theory or technique's 'scientific validity' is reviewed de novo as a matter of law. Under this standard, Comparison Question Technique (CQT) polygraph evidence has not been shown to be sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Daubert/Coon standard and is generally inadmissible over objection in Alaska courts.
Facts:
- Thomas Alexander was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor.
- Alexander hired Dr. David Raskin, a polygraph examiner, to administer a CQT polygraph examination, after which Dr. Raskin concluded Alexander answered truthfully when denying the charges.
- Jyzyk Sharpe was charged with murder and manslaughter in connection with the death of his girlfriend’s two-year-old son.
- Sharpe also hired Dr. Raskin for a CQT polygraph examination, after which Dr. Raskin concluded Sharpe answered truthfully when denying the charges.
- During a second polygraph test administered for the State by former FBI agent Kendall Shull, Sharpe prematurely terminated the examination when Shull asked Sharpe if he was using countermeasures.
- Jeffery Holt was charged with five counts of first-degree sexual assault.
- Holt also hired Dr. Raskin for a CQT polygraph examination, after which Dr. Raskin concluded Holt was being truthful when he denied the charges on the grounds that the alleged victim consented to sexual activity.
Procedural Posture:
- In Alexander’s case, Superior Court Judge Gregory Miller held an evidentiary hearing, consolidated with an unrelated criminal case, to address the admissibility of polygraph results.
- Judges Miller and Schally issued a joint order concluding that CQT polygraph testing satisfied the Daubert/Coon requirements and found the evidence admissible on condition that Alexander first testified at trial and agreed to a State-administered polygraph test.
- In Sharpe’s case, Superior Court Judge Eric Smith relied on the record and evidence presented in Alexander’s Daubert hearing and held that the testimony would be admissible under the same reasoning, with a limiting instruction that examiners could only testify to Sharpe’s belief, not objective truthfulness, and allowing the State to present evidence of Sharpe’s lack of cooperation in rebuttal for prematurely terminating his second polygraph test.
- In Holt’s case, Superior Court Judge Charles Huguelet, after reviewing the evidence from Alexander’s case, concluded that polygraph evidence is not sufficiently reliable and would be inadmissible under various evidence rules.
- After a jury trial, Holt was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual assault and four counts of second-degree sexual assault.
- In Alexander’s case, the State filed a petition for review to the Alaska Court of Appeals challenging the admissibility, and Alexander filed a cross-petition challenging the conditions.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the order admitting Dr. Raskin’s testimony and upheld the conditions, but expressed concern about the abuse of discretion standard of review for Daubert/Coon determinations.
- In Sharpe’s case, the State filed a petition for review to the Court of Appeals challenging the ruling admitting Dr. Raskin’s testimony, which the Court of Appeals denied based on its ruling in Alexander.
- The State filed petitions for hearing to the Alaska Supreme Court in both Alexander’s and Sharpe’s cases; Alexander and Sharpe filed a joint cross-petition challenging the requirement that they agree to testify (this specific challenge was later dropped).
- Holt appealed his convictions and sentence to the Court of Appeals, arguing the exclusion of Dr. Raskin’s testimony was error. The Court of Appeals severed Holt’s polygraph question and certified it to the Alaska Supreme Court, again asking to revisit the applicable standard of review.
- The Alaska Supreme Court granted all petitions and cross-petitions, and accepted certification, consolidating the cases for briefing.
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Issue:
Does expert testimony regarding Comparison Question Technique (CQT) polygraph examination results satisfy the Daubert/Coon standard for scientific reliability and admissibility in Alaska courts, and what is the appropriate appellate standard of review for such determinations?
Opinions:
Majority - Stowers, Chief Justice
No, expert testimony regarding Comparison Question Technique (CQT) polygraph examination results does not satisfy the Daubert/Coon standard for scientific reliability and admissibility in Alaska courts. The appropriate appellate standard of review for Daubert/Coon determinations is a hybrid approach where preliminary factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while the ultimate question of scientific validity is reviewed de novo with independent judgment. First, the Court revisits its prior standard of review for Daubert/Coon determinations, rejecting the sole abuse of discretion standard articulated in State v. Coon. The Court notes the inconsistency resulting from different superior courts reaching opposite conclusions regarding CQT polygraph evidence based on identical records, which creates an appearance of arbitrariness and undermines public confidence in the judiciary. Thus, the Court adopts a hybrid standard: preliminary factual findings made by the superior court are reviewed for clear error; the ultimate question of whether a scientific theory or technique is 'scientifically valid' under Daubert and Coon is a question of law reviewed de novo using independent judgment; and case-specific determinations and further evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. This standard aims for consistency across courts and allows for the law of scientific evidence to evolve with scientific progress. Second, applying the Daubert/Coon standard and the new hybrid review, the Court concludes that CQT polygraph testing has not been shown to be sufficiently reliable for admissibility: 1. Empirical Testing: The Court finds the superior court's finding that the underlying hypotheses of CQT polygraphy have been empirically tested to be partly erroneous. While the practical applications have been tested, the fundamental psychological assumptions (e.g., that deception produces measurably different psychological and physiological states from nervousness or fear of false accusation) are largely untested and may be functionally untestable. This factor weighs decidedly against admissibility. 2. Peer Review: While CQT polygraphy has been subjected to publication and peer review, the Court notes that this scrutiny has not led to significant refinement or development of the technique over decades. The continued vigorous debate over substantive flaws despite publication lessens the weight given to this factor. 3. Acceptable Error Rate: The Court finds the superior court clearly erred in finding the error rate 'sufficiently reliable.' Dr. Iacono's testimony highlighted that field studies are often biased towards overestimating accuracy, and, crucially, there is a complete absence of reliable 'base rate' data (the proportion of deceptive individuals in the tested population). Without such data, the predictive value and thus the reliability of polygraph results cannot be assessed. This factor weighs against admissibility. 4. Standards for Operation: The Court acknowledges some standards exist but points out significant areas of examiner discretion, including question formulation, pretest interviews, scoring system choice, and evaluation of examinee demeanor. The lack of clear, consistent controlling standards weighs against admissibility. 5. General Acceptance: The Court agrees that general acceptance within the relevant scientific community (excluding practitioners) is inconclusive. The minimal support for CQT polygraphy outside the community of practicing examiners, despite decades of debate, weighs against admissibility. 6. Other Relevant Factors: The Court notes concerns about potential litigation motives, such as Dr. Raskin's financial ties to a polygraph manufacturer, and the prevalence of industry-funded research supporting polygraph validity, necessitating careful scrutiny. Considering these factors, the Court concludes that CQT polygraph testing lacks persuasive data demonstrating its reliability and does not qualify as 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' that 'will assist the trier of fact' under Alaska Evidence Rule 702. The Court reiterates its earlier stance from Pulakis v. State (1970) that polygraph proponents have not developed persuasive data demonstrating its reliability, thus maintaining a general inadmissibility over objection.
Analysis:
This case fundamentally reshapes the appellate standard of review for scientific evidence admissibility in Alaska, moving from a deferential abuse of discretion standard to a hybrid approach incorporating de novo review for the core scientific validity of a technique. This shift is significant as it promotes consistency across trial courts, aiming to prevent disparate rulings on identical scientific evidence based solely on the presiding judge. For future cases involving scientific expert testimony, this ruling means that once an appellate court has ruled on the general scientific validity of a technique, trial courts and litigants will have a clearer precedent, potentially streamlining litigation by reducing the need to relitigate established scientific principles. However, it also places a higher burden on proponents of novel or controversial scientific methods to demonstrate robust scientific reliability at the initial Daubert/Coon hearing, as appellate courts will now independently scrutinize their scientific underpinnings.
