State v. Schipman
299 Mont. 273, 2 P.3d 223, 2000 MT 102 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
For a defendant's conduct to be the cause-in-fact of a death in a negligent homicide case, the prosecution must prove that the death would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's negligent act. A defendant's negligence is not the cause-in-fact if subsequent, intervening actions by third parties provide the same warnings the defendant could have, thereby breaking the chain of causation.
Facts:
- On a dark and rainy night, after consuming several beers, Stacy J. Schipman was driving home when his truck struck a dark-colored horse.
- Schipman did not stop, believing the impact had knocked the horse into a ditch and that it was not on the highway.
- Schipman later admitted he did not stop or report the incident immediately because he had been drinking and feared being charged with a DUI.
- Another driver, Andy Weakley, later discovered the dead horse lying motionless across a lane of the highway.
- Weakley and another driver who arrived, Larry Mallon, parked their vehicles, activated their hazard lights, and attempted to wave their arms to warn oncoming traffic.
- Jamie Keller, with Tresa Dorvall as her passenger, saw the stopped vehicles and the men on the roadside but, at Dorvall's urging not to stop, continued driving.
- Keller then saw the horse too late to avoid a collision; the resulting crash threw Dorvall from the vehicle, causing fatal injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Stacy J. Schipman was tried by a jury in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County.
- The jury convicted Schipman of felony negligent homicide and misdemeanor negligent endangerment.
- The District Court entered a Judgment & Order Deferring Imposition of Sentence.
- Schipman appealed the conviction for negligent homicide to the Supreme Court of Montana.
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Issue:
Does a driver's negligent act of leaving the scene after fatally striking a horse constitute the cause-in-fact of a subsequent death, as required for a negligent homicide conviction, when other motorists later arrive and make every reasonable effort to warn oncoming traffic of the hazard?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Hunt
No. Schipman's conduct was not the cause-in-fact of Tresa Dorvall's death. The State failed to prove that the fatal accident would not have occurred 'but for' Schipman's failure to remain at the scene and warn others. After Schipman left, two other motorists arrived and made every reasonable effort to warn oncoming traffic by using hazard lights and waving their arms. The court reasoned that had Schipman stopped, he could not have done more than what these other individuals already did. Since the victims' vehicle consciously disregarded the clear warnings provided, there is no basis to speculate that the presence of a third person (Schipman) would have changed the outcome.
Dissenting - Justice Gray
Yes. The question of whether Schipman's negligence caused the death is a question of fact that should have been left for the jury to decide. The majority improperly views the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and decides the case as a matter of law. A rational jury could have found that 'but for' Schipman's negligence, Dorvall would not have died. For example, Schipman could have parked his vehicle with headlights shining on the horse as a more effective warning, or he could have immediately called 911, potentially allowing law enforcement to secure the scene with flares and patrol car lights before the fatal accident occurred.
Dissenting - Justice Leaphart
Yes. The majority gives too much credit to Schipman's 'mistaken belief' that the horse was in the ditch. It is unreasonable to believe that a 'meaningless glance' in a rearview mirror on a dark, rainy night could have provided any reliable information about the location of a dark horse. Schipman's justification for leaving the scene was not credible, and the question of causation, based on his negligent failure to act, was properly a matter for the jury.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the 'but-for' causation test in negligent homicide cases involving intervening actors. The court's decision establishes that if a third party's intervening actions are functionally equivalent to what the negligent defendant could have done, the chain of causation may be broken as a matter of law. This ruling makes it more difficult for the prosecution to secure a conviction where 'good Samaritans' appear on the scene after the defendant's negligent act but before the ultimate harm occurs. It underscores that mere speculation about what might have happened is insufficient to establish cause-in-fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
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