State v. Sanders
2005 WL 1457746, 905 So. 2d 241, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 9623 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory provision that a defendant's failure to return leased property constitutes 'prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent' creates only a permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption. Consequently, where the state's evidence of intent is entirely circumstantial, the state cannot rely solely on this inference and must present additional evidence to refute any reasonable hypothesis of innocence to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal.
Facts:
- On February 26, 2003, Alexia Sommer Sanders entered into a rental agreement with Buddy’s Home Furnishings.
- Sanders took possession of a sofa, a chair, and a spider lamp, with total rental payments agreed to be $1509.53.
- Sanders did not make any payments on the rental agreement.
- Buddy's Home Furnishings attempted to contact Sanders by sending a certified letter.
- The letter was returned undelivered, as Sanders had moved without providing a forwarding address.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Alexia Sommer Sanders in a Florida trial court with a third-degree felony for failure to return leased equipment in violation of section 812.155, Florida Statutes.
- Prior to trial, Sanders challenged the state's case, which relied on the statutory inference of fraudulent intent.
- The trial court entered an order adverse to Sanders, allowing the prosecution to proceed.
- Sanders petitioned the Florida Second District Court of Appeal for a writ of certiorari, seeking to have the trial court's order quashed.
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Issue:
Under Florida Statute § 812.155, does a defendant's failure to return leased property after a certified letter is returned undelivered, without more, create a permissive inference of fraudulent intent sufficient to overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal in a case based on circumstantial evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Casanueva, Judge
No. The petition for certiorari is granted and the trial court's order is quashed. This case is controlled by the court's prior holding in State v. Rygwelski, which established the proper interpretation and application of the statutory inference at issue.
Concurring - Altenbernd, Chief Judge
No. The statutory language creates only a permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption, and therefore the traditional rules governing circumstantial evidence apply. Our precedent in Rygwelski correctly held that the phrase 'prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent' in section 812.155 establishes a permissive inference. Under the circumstantial evidence rule from State v. Law, the State must present evidence inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Here, the State's evidence—failure to pay and failure to receive a certified letter—leaves open multiple reasonable hypotheses of innocence, such as the furniture being stolen, destroyed, or seized by a landlord. If the statute were read to create a rebuttable presumption, it would unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Because it is only an inference, the State must present additional evidence of fraudulent intent to defeat a judgment of acquittal.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the practical impact of State v. Rygwelski, confirming that statutory 'prima facie evidence' clauses in criminal law create only permissive inferences, not burden-shifting presumptions. It reinforces the constitutional protection that the state bears the full burden of proof, especially in circumstantial evidence cases. The decision significantly curtails the ability of prosecutors to bring charges for failure to return leased property without independent evidence of fraudulent intent, thereby preventing the criminal justice system from being used as a state-funded debt collection agency for rental companies.
