State v. Sanchez
133 So.3d 1038, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 155, 2014 WL 51696 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
Under Florida law, an individual must hold a profession explicitly enumerated in the statutory definition of a "practitioner" to be subject to the specific criminal statutes governing practitioners; otherwise, they may be charged under general drug trafficking statutes.
Facts:
- An individual, who was a licensed medical assistant and nurse practitioner, was involved in the distribution of controlled substances, specifically oxycodone.
- This individual allegedly wrote prescriptions for these controlled substances.
- The state alleged these prescriptions were written in bad faith and not in the course of professional practice.
- The alleged actions involved the sale or delivery of 4 grams or more of oxycodone.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Florida charged the appellee in a trial court with nine offenses, including trafficking in oxycodone under section 893.135(l)(c).
- The appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing she should have been charged under a different statute, section 893.13(8)(a), because she was a licensed nurse practitioner.
- The trial court granted the appellee's motion, dismissing six counts and four predicate incidents.
- The State, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's order of dismissal to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a licensed medical assistant and nurse practitioner qualify as a 'practitioner' under the plain language of section 893.02(20), Florida Statutes, requiring the state to charge them under the statute specific to practitioners for illegal prescription writing, rather than the general drug trafficking statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Levine, J.
No. A licensed medical assistant and nurse practitioner does not qualify as a 'practitioner' under the plain language of section 893.02(20). The court reasoned that the statutory definition of 'practitioner' provides an exhaustive list of specific professions, such as physician, dentist, and veterinarian, which does not include medical assistants or nurses. Applying the canon of statutory interpretation 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' (the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others), the court concluded that the legislature's omission of these roles was intentional. Therefore, because the appellee is not a 'practitioner,' she cannot be charged under the statute specific to practitioners and was properly charged under the general trafficking statute. The court further noted that even if she were a practitioner, precedent allows the state to charge under either the general trafficking statute or the specific practitioner statute.
Analysis:
This decision strictly construes the statutory definition of 'practitioner,' reinforcing that criminal statutes will be interpreted based on their plain language. It clarifies the prosecutorial discretion in charging individuals involved in prescription drug diversion, establishing that medical professionals not explicitly listed in the statute face the same severe trafficking penalties as non-medical individuals. The ruling limits the ability of defendants in adjacent medical fields, like nursing or medical assistance, to claim they should be charged under the more specific, and potentially more lenient, statutes designed for prescribing practitioners. This solidifies a clear, bright-line rule based on the enumerated list in the statute.
