State v. Saiez
489 So. 2d 1125, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 262 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal statute that prohibits the mere possession of equipment with legitimate and widespread lawful uses, without requiring proof of criminal intent, violates substantive due process by not bearing a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective.
Facts:
- Section 817.63, Florida Statutes (1983), made it a crime to possess "with knowledge of its character any machinery, plates or any other contrivance designed to reproduce instruments purporting to be the credit cards of an issuer who has not consented to the preparation of such credit cards."
- This statute, by its plain language, criminalized the mere possession of embossing machines, irrespective of whether the possessor intended to use them for legitimate purposes or for credit card fraud.
- Salvadore Saiez was in possession of embossing machines.
- Embossing machines are tools that have numerous legitimate commercial and personal uses, beyond the reproduction of credit cards.
Procedural Posture:
- Salvadore Saiez was charged in the trial court with three violations of section 817.63, Florida Statutes (1983), including two counts for unlawful possession of embossing machines.
- Saiez filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss counts 1 and 3, arguing the portion of the statute prohibiting the possession of machinery was unconstitutional because it prohibited mere possession regardless of legitimate use.
- The trial court agreed with Saiez and dismissed counts 1 and 3.
- The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal.
- The State of Florida appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida concerning the constitutionality of the statute.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that criminalizes the mere possession of embossing machines, without requiring proof of intent to use them for unlawful purposes, violate the substantive due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions?
Opinions:
Majority - Barkett
Yes, a state statute that criminalizes the mere possession of embossing machines, without requiring proof of intent to use them for unlawful purposes, violates the substantive due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions because the means chosen are not reasonably related to the legitimate legislative purpose. The Court first addressed and rejected the district court's reasoning that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. The overbreadth doctrine applies only if legislation is susceptible to infringing on First Amendment protected conduct, which is not implicated by Section 817.63. The statute was not vague because it clearly and unambiguously prohibited the possession of embossing machines by anyone, leaving no room for ordinary people to guess its meaning. However, the Court found the statute violated substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution. While curtailing credit card fraud is a legitimate legislative goal under the state's police power, the means chosen—criminalizing mere possession of embossing machines—was not rationally related to that goal. Embossing machines have common and widespread lawful uses in businesses and non-criminal activities. Citing precedents like Delmonico v. State (prohibiting spearfishing equipment without intent), Robinson v. State (prohibiting masks without criminal intent), and State v. Walker (prohibiting controlled substance in original container), the Court emphasized that it is unreasonable to criminalize inherently innocent activity or the mere possession of objects with lawful uses without evidence of criminal intent. Such a broad restriction, based merely on convenience of enforcement, constitutes an unwarranted exercise of police power.
Concurring - McDonald
Justice McDonald concurred in the result only, meaning he agreed with the outcome (that the statute was unconstitutional) but did not necessarily agree with all the reasoning of the majority opinion.
Concurring - Boyd
Chief Justice Boyd and Justices Adkins, Overton, Ehrlich, and Shaw concurred with the majority opinion, indicating their agreement with both the outcome and the reasoning.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits the scope of state police power in Florida, particularly regarding criminal statutes that target the mere possession of objects. It reaffirms that even for legitimate state interests, the means chosen must bear a rational relationship to the objective and avoid criminalizing inherently innocent conduct or the possession of items with widespread lawful uses without a requirement of criminal intent. The decision highlights the importance of substantive due process as a check on legislative overreach, preventing laws that sweep too broadly and infringe on personal liberties without adequate justification. Future statutes attempting to criminalize possession of common items will likely require a showing of specific criminal intent to withstand due process challenges.
