State v. Russell G. Jones
2013 Ida. LEXIS 96, 154 Idaho 412, 299 P.3d 219 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
Idaho's forcible rape statute, I.C. § 18-6101(3), does not require a victim to resist to their utmost physical ability, and verbal resistance is sufficient. However, the 'force or violence' element requires force beyond that which is inherent in the sexual act itself (extrinsic force).
Facts:
- Russell G. Jones, Craig Carpenter, and A.S. were longtime friends; Carpenter and A.S. were engaged with children, but Jones and A.S. had been sexually involved for approximately four years without Carpenter's knowledge.
- On May 22, 2008, after a night in Jackpot, Nevada, Jones and A.S. decided to end their affair; later that morning, they had consensual sex at A.S.'s apartment.
- Immediately after the consensual act, A.S. was lying on her stomach on the bed when Jones sat next to her and started touching her; A.S. told him, 'I thought we had decided that the time before . . . was the last time and it wasn’t going to happen anymore.'
- Jones then got behind A.S., undid his pants, pushed her down with his body weight, pinning her hands, and had intercourse with her while A.S. 'kept yelling at him and pleading for him to stop and please quit.'
- Afterwards, Jones apologized to A.S., asked if she was okay, admitted he 'lost control,' and stated she could press charges.
- On May 27, Jones spent the night at A.S.'s apartment; the next morning, after Carpenter left and the children went to school, A.S. felt drowsy from medication and laid down on the living room couch.
- Jones joined A.S. on the couch, pulled her hair hard enough to hurt, grabbed and squeezed her breast, then touched her vaginal area and inserted his fingers; A.S. 'just froze' and testified she was 'paralyzed' with fear.
- Jones pulled down A.S.'s pants and underwear, pushed her legs apart, and had sex with her; later, in the bedroom, Jones began intercourse again but stopped, asking A.S. if he could have sex, to which she repeatedly said 'no, my kids are going to be home soon.'
- On May 29, A.S. made a recorded call to Jones where he apologized for both incidents, admitting he 'continued' despite her protests (first incident) and non-response (second incident), and stating, 'I think that I pushed things too far and I guess it’s rape. I did it. You obviously didn’t want any part of it.'
Procedural Posture:
- Russell G. Jones was charged with two counts of forcible rape under I.C. § 18-6101(3) for incidents occurring on May 22 (Count I) and May 28 (Count II).
- An Elmore County jury convicted Jones of both counts of forcible rape.
- Jones was sentenced to concurrent 25-year sentences, with five years determinate for each count.
- Jones appealed his conviction to the Idaho Court of Appeals.
- The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on Count I but reversed the conviction on Count II; it also held that the district court’s decision to admit the un-redacted tape into evidence was harmless error.
- Jones petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for review, which was granted to consider the force and resistance necessary for a charge of forcible rape.
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Issue:
1. Is verbal resistance sufficient to satisfy the 'resistance' element of Idaho's forcible rape statute, I.C. § 18-6101(3)? 2. Does the 'force or violence' element of I.C. § 18-6101(3) require force beyond that which is inherent in the sexual act itself?
Opinions:
Majority - J. Jones
1. Yes, verbal resistance is sufficient to satisfy the 'resistance' element of Idaho's forcible rape statute, I.C. § 18-6101(3). The Court concluded that Idaho case law, particularly State v. Neil (1907) and State v. Andreason (1927), rejected the common law's 'utmost physical resistance' standard over a century ago. The statute itself only requires 'resistance,' not 'physical' resistance, and its purpose is to demonstrate the assailant's intent to use force and the victim's non-consent. Public policy further supports this, as requiring physical resistance can increase a victim's danger. For Count I (May 22 incident), A.S.'s repeated verbal pleas to Jones to stop, while physically pinned, constituted sufficient resistance under the statute. 2. Yes, the 'force or violence' element of I.C. § 18-6101(3) requires force beyond that which is inherent in the sexual act itself, known as the 'extrinsic force' standard. The Court reasoned that adopting an 'intrinsic force' standard (where the act of penetration itself is sufficient force) would effectively render the statutory 'force' element meaningless, violating the principle that statutes should not be interpreted to be nullities. Furthermore, the Idaho Legislature has not reformed its rape statute to eliminate a resistance requirement, as some jurisdictions that adopt the intrinsic force standard have done. For Count I, Jones's actions—using his body weight to push A.S. down, pinning her hands, and effectively forestalling any struggle—demonstrated force beyond that inherent in the sexual act, providing sufficient evidence for the jury to convict. However, regarding Count II (May 28 incident), the Court found insufficient evidence of resistance. A.S. admitted she 'just froze' and did not verbally or physically respond to Jones’ advances. The Court acknowledged that 'freezing up' is a legitimate reaction for sexual assault victims but held that Idaho's statute explicitly requires 'some quantum of resistance,' and the Court lacks the authority to nullify this legislative requirement. Therefore, the conviction on Count II was reversed. Additionally, the district court erred by admitting a specific unredacted statement about M.C. from the taped call without fully analyzing its relevance under I.R.E. 404(b) and 403, but this error was deemed harmless given the overwhelming admissible evidence of Jones' guilt for Count I, including his own taped admissions and text messages.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies Idaho's interpretation of its forcible rape statute, aligning it with modern understandings of sexual assault by explicitly allowing verbal resistance and rejecting the outdated 'utmost physical resistance' requirement. The affirmation of the 'extrinsic force' standard ensures the 'force' element remains meaningful, requiring proof of force beyond the inherent actions of sexual penetration. However, the reversal of Count II highlights a critical limitation: despite recognizing the 'frozen fright' response, the Court maintains that some demonstrable resistance (verbal or physical) is statutorily required, underscoring the ongoing legal challenge for victims whose non-consent is expressed through non-action due to fear. This case provides important guidance for prosecutors and could prompt future legislative consideration regarding the resistance requirement.
