State v. Rollins
321 S.W.3d 353, 2010 WL 2730586 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Under Missouri's attempt statute (§ 564.011), voluntary abandonment of criminal purpose is generally not a defense once a 'substantial step' has been taken towards the commission of an offense, although it may be a factor in determining if a substantial step showing 'firmness of purpose' was ever taken. Additionally, a prosecutor's peremptory strike is race-neutral if the stated reason is not the juror's race, even if that reason has a disparate impact, and a trial court's finding on discriminatory intent is afforded great deference.
Facts:
- In late May 2005, Tommy Rollins, Jr. was angry that he had been discharged from his job as a custodian at an elementary school.
- Rollins decided to take revenge on the principal, Dred Scott, by killing him at his home, and subsequently looked up Scott’s address and obtained directions.
- Rollins purchased a semi-automatic handgun, loaded it, and assembled two firebombs consisting of gasoline in bottles with washcloth wicks.
- At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 28, 2005, Rollins was driving towards Scott's house when Missouri State Highway Patrolman Brandon Brashear noticed Rollins speeding and initiated a traffic stop.
- Rollins drove away, leading Brashear on a pursuit; when Rollins eventually pulled over and stopped, he emerged from his vehicle with the semi-automatic handgun.
- As Brashear exited his patrol car, Rollins immediately commenced firing, advanced toward Brashear, hitting him multiple times, and continued shooting him after Brashear fell to the ground, hitting him in the back and jaw.
- Following the attack on Brashear, Rollins continued driving to Scott’s subdivision, drove around the neighborhood, and then left the gun and firebombs in the weeds in a lot.
- Rollins then drove to a bar, entered, and told the bartender that he had just shot a police officer and wanted to turn himself in.
Procedural Posture:
- Tommy Rollins, Jr. was charged in Jackson County Circuit Court with first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, armed criminal action, first-degree assault (as an attempt) against Dred Scott, and unlawful possession of a weapon.
- Rollins entered a plea of not guilty, contending he was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility.
- After a trial in 2008, a jury found Rollins guilty on all counts and recommended specific sentences for each conviction.
- The Jackson County Circuit Court imposed sentences following the jury's recommendations.
- Rollins appealed his convictions to the Missouri Court of Appeals, seeking a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly overruled his objections to the State’s peremptory challenges and erred in refusing to give his requested instruction as to abandonment or renunciation of criminal purpose.
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Issue:
1. Does Missouri law, specifically § 564.011, allow for a jury instruction on voluntary abandonment of criminal purpose as a defense to an attempt charge once a substantial step has been taken? 2. Did the trial court clearly err in overruling a Batson challenge to a peremptory strike of an African-American venireperson when the State provided facially race-neutral reasons for the strike, even if those reasons arguably had a disparate impact?
Opinions:
Majority - James M. Smart, Jr.
1. No, Missouri law does not allow for a jury instruction on voluntary abandonment of criminal purpose as a defense to an attempt charge once a substantial step has been taken, as the statutory definition of 'attempt' under § 564.011 does not include such a defense. The court explained that Missouri's current attempt statute, adopted from the Model Penal Code, superseded the common law concept of abandonment as a defense. While an effort to abandon or renounce criminal purpose before the offense is completed may be pertinent to the determination of whether a 'substantial step' was taken, and thus the 'firmness of purpose,' it does not serve as an independent defense once such a step has been accomplished. The court distinguished State ex rel. Verweire v. Moore, clarifying that Verweire addressed whether a 'substantial step' sufficient to demonstrate a 'firmness of purpose' to kill or cause serious injury was ever taken, rather than whether abandonment was a defense after such a step. Any repentance after a substantial step, the court noted, may be pertinent to mitigation of punishment but does not constitute an exemption from conviction. 2. No, the trial court did not clearly err in overruling the Batson challenge because the State provided facially race-neutral reasons for striking venireperson 33, and Rollins failed to demonstrate that these reasons were pretextual. The court reaffirmed that a reason for a peremptory strike is race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is 'inherent' in the prosecutor's explanation, citing Hernandez v. New York. Disparate impact, while relevant to the pretext inquiry, is not determinative of whether an explanation is race-neutral on its face in the first step of the Batson analysis. The prosecutor's stated reasons—that the venireperson had experienced racial discrimination by police and believed his uncle was unjustly convicted by the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office—were deemed logically relevant to the venireperson's impartiality, especially given Rollins's defense involving allegations of racist police. The court emphasized the great deference given to the trial court's judgment regarding discriminatory intent and credibility evaluations.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the reach of Missouri's attempt statute, confirming that the common law defense of abandonment of criminal purpose is largely no longer applicable once a substantial step has been taken. It reinforces that a change of heart is only relevant to challenging whether the 'firmness of purpose' element of an attempt was ever met. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the application of the Batson framework in Missouri, particularly stressing that disparate impact alone does not render an explanation for a peremptory strike non-race-neutral in the initial assessment, and that trial court findings on discriminatory intent are highly deferential. This impacts how 'attempt' crimes are prosecuted and limits certain defense strategies based on post-substantial-step repentance, while also guiding prosecutors and defense attorneys on what constitutes a valid race-neutral reason for peremptory strikes.
