State v. Robert Joseph Stietz
375 Wis. 2d 572, 895 N.W.2d 796, 2017 WI 58 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of defense, such as self-defense, if there is 'some evidence' to support it when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the accused. A court may not weigh the evidence's credibility or totality when deciding whether to issue the instruction, as that function belongs exclusively to the jury.
Facts:
- Robert Stietz, a 64-year-old farmer, owned a parcel of fenced and posted private land where he had previously experienced problems with trespassers.
- On the final day of deer hunting season, Stietz patrolled his property for trespassers while carrying a rifle for safety and a handgun in his pocket.
- Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Wardens Joseph Frost and Nick Webster, suspecting illegal hunting after seeing Stietz's car, entered the private property without a warrant or consent.
- It was nearly dark when the wardens, wearing blaze orange jackets with DNR insignia, confronted Stietz, who was dressed in camouflage.
- Stietz claimed he did not recognize the men as wardens and believed they were armed trespassers hunting illegally.
- After Stietz twice refused to surrender his rifle, Warden Frost initiated physical contact, and the two wardens forcibly wrested the rifle away from Stietz.
- Immediately after Stietz was disarmed of his rifle, Warden Webster drew his handgun and pointed it at him, followed by Warden Frost drawing his own handgun.
- Stietz, testifying that he feared he was about to be shot, then drew his handgun from his pocket, leading to an armed standoff.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Wisconsin charged Robert Stietz in the Circuit Court for Lafayette County with six offenses, including resisting an officer and intentionally pointing a firearm at an officer.
- At the conclusion of a jury trial, the circuit court denied Stietz's request for a jury instruction on the privilege of self-defense.
- The jury convicted Stietz on one count of resisting an officer and one count of intentionally pointing a firearm at an officer, acquitting him of the four other charges.
- Stietz appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing the circuit court's refusal to instruct on self-defense was a reversible error.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction.
- The Supreme Court of Wisconsin granted Stietz's petition for review.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by refusing to provide a jury instruction on self-defense when the defendant presents 'some evidence,' even if weak or contradicted, that they reasonably believed they were terminating an unlawful interference with their person?
Opinions:
Majority - Shirley S. Abrahamson
Yes. A trial court errs by refusing a self-defense instruction when the defendant presents 'some evidence' to support the defense, viewed in the most favorable light to the accused. The standard to receive a self-defense instruction is a 'low bar,' requiring only 'some evidence,' which may be 'weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.' The court's role is not to weigh the evidence or judge credibility, as the reasonableness of a defendant's beliefs is a question 'peculiarly within the province of the jury.' Here, a reasonable jury could have believed Stietz's version of events: that he mistook the wardens for trespassers, that they unlawfully interfered with his person by forcibly taking his rifle and drawing handguns on him, and that he drew his own weapon in a reasonable fear for his life. Because the erroneous refusal to give the instruction was not harmless, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Dissenting - Annette Kingsland Ziegler
No. A trial court does not err in declining to give a self-defense instruction when the defendant's claim is 'so thoroughly discredited' by the evidence that no reasonable jury could believe it. The wardens wore jackets and hats with DNR insignia, and Stietz's own testimony confirmed he heard one of them say 'Warden.' More importantly, Stietz admitted he knew they were law enforcement when they called for backup, yet he continued the armed standoff for over half an hour. The law does not permit citizens to forcibly resist officers, even if they believe the officers' actions are mistaken; the proper recourse is the judicial system, not armed confrontation. The jury's thoughtful verdict, acquitting on some charges but convicting on others, shows it carefully considered the facts, and this verdict should not be disturbed.
Concurring - Rebecca Grassl Bradley
Yes. The court correctly reverses for failure to give the self-defense instruction, but it should also have addressed the circuit court's error in refusing to allow Stietz to argue that the wardens were trespassers. The wardens lacked statutory authority, a warrant, or reasonable suspicion to enter Stietz's private, fenced, and posted property. The 'open fields' doctrine does not grant law enforcement a license to enter private property without a legal basis or to seize a person lawfully present there. The fact that the wardens were trespassing is directly relevant to the reasonableness of Stietz's belief that they were unlawful aggressors, which is a key element of his self-defense claim and his defense against the charge of resisting an officer acting with 'lawful authority.'
Analysis:
This decision strongly reinforces the low evidentiary threshold required for a defendant to receive a jury instruction on an affirmative defense. It strictly separates the judge's gatekeeping function—determining if 'some evidence' exists—from the jury's fact-finding role of weighing evidence and assessing credibility. The ruling makes it significantly harder for trial courts to deny defense instructions by pre-judging the plausibility of a defendant's narrative. This precedent solidifies the jury's power to consider all legally supported theories of a case, even those based on testimony that may seem weak or inconsistent to a judge.
