State v. Ripley
626 S.E.2d 289, 360 N.C. 333, 2006 N.C. LEXIS 21 (2006)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The restraint or asportation of a victim that is an inherent, inevitable, and integral part of another felony, such as armed robbery, is a "mere technical asportation" and cannot support a separate conviction for kidnapping.
Facts:
- On May 30, 2003, Antonio Lamarquisa Ripley and four underage accomplices engaged in a series of robberies.
- After robbing one hotel, the group went to the Extended Stay America Motel in Jacksonville, North Carolina.
- Ripley waited in the car while his accomplices entered the lobby, robbed the front desk clerk at gunpoint, and then hid to await more victims.
- Dennis and Tracy Long, along with Skylar and Adrian Panter, approached the motel's entranceway.
- Tracy Long noticed the robbery in progress as her husband opened the door and attempted to turn her group away from the entrance.
- One of Ripley's accomplices saw them, pointed a gun at the group, and ordered them to enter the motel lobby.
- Once inside the lobby, the Longs and Panters were forced to the floor, searched, and robbed.
Procedural Posture:
- Antonio Lamarquisa Ripley was indicted by an Onslow County Grand Jury on multiple charges, including fifteen counts of second-degree kidnapping.
- At his jury trial in the Superior Court (trial court), Ripley moved to dismiss the kidnapping charges at the close of the State's evidence.
- The trial court denied the motion.
- The jury returned guilty verdicts on fifteen counts of second-degree kidnapping, along with several robbery charges.
- Ripley appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss nine of the kidnapping convictions to the North Carolina Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, vacating the nine contested kidnapping convictions.
- The State, as the appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina based on the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, limiting the scope of review to four of the kidnapping convictions involving the Long and Panter families.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the asportation of robbery victims from an entranceway into a motel lobby during the commission of the robbery constitute a separate and independent act sufficient to support a second-degree kidnapping conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Brady, Justice
No. The asportation of the victims from one side of the motel lobby door to the other was not a separate act legally sufficient to justify separate kidnapping convictions. Under North Carolina law established in cases like State v. Fulcher and State v. Irwin, a restraint or movement that is an inherent and inevitable feature of another felony cannot also constitute kidnapping. The act of kidnapping must be a separate, complete act, independent of the other felony. Here, forcing the victims into the lobby was an inherent part of the ongoing armed robbery, serving only to bring them into the location where the robbery was taking place. The court classified this as a "mere technical asportation" and, therefore, an insufficient basis for a kidnapping charge, without needing to consider whether it increased the victims' danger or facilitated the robbery.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces and clarifies the doctrine that prevents the state from converting every robbery or similar felony involving movement into a separate kidnapping. By labeling the minor movement of the victims a "mere technical asportation," the court solidifies the high bar required for a kidnapping conviction to stand alongside another felony. This precedent requires lower courts to scrutinize the nature of the victim's movement, ensuring it is a genuinely separate and independent act rather than merely incidental to the commission of the primary crime. The ruling limits prosecutorial discretion to 'stack' charges and protects defendants from being convicted of two crimes for what is essentially a single criminal transaction.
