State v. Riley
442 A.2d 1297, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 469, 141 Vt. 29 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
For an assault conviction based on attempting to put another in fear of serious bodily injury, the defendant need only have the apparent ability to inflict harm, not the actual, present ability to do so.
Facts:
- A state trooper observed the defendant's car stopped in the breakdown lane of a highway in the early morning hours.
- The defendant was in the driver's seat with the interior light on, massaging his leg.
- While inspecting the vehicle from the outside, the trooper noticed a handgun on the seat next to the defendant.
- The trooper ordered the defendant to place his hands on the steering wheel, which he did, but the defendant then refused an order to get out of the car.
- When the trooper repeated the order to exit the vehicle, the defendant dropped his hand from the wheel and reached toward the handgun.
- The trooper testified that he was frightened and feared for his life at that moment.
- The defendant then moved the gun across the seat and placed it on the floor before getting out.
- The handgun was later discovered to be inoperable because it lacked a firing pin.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged with attempting by physical menace to put another in fear of serious bodily injury under 13 V.S.A. § 1023(a)(3).
- After a trial in a Vermont trial court, a jury found the defendant guilty.
- The defendant (appellant) appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court of Vermont, arguing the State (appellee) failed to prove all elements of the crime.
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Issue:
Does a defendant commit assault by physical menace when they reach for a handgun, placing a law enforcement officer in reasonable fear of serious bodily injury, even if the handgun is inoperable?
Opinions:
Majority - Barney, C.J.
Yes. A defendant commits assault by physical menace by placing another in fear of bodily injury, and this requires only an apparent, not an actual, ability to inflict that injury. The court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that Vermont's assault statute incorporates the civil tort concept of assault, where causing a reasonable apprehension of harm is the key element. Citing State v. Deso, the court held that apparent power to do bodily harm is sufficient. The rationale is that a threat causing apprehension, even if a bluff, is likely to cause a breach of the peace and is therefore a punishable offense. The jury was the proper body to weigh the conflicting testimonies and determine from the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances whether he possessed the criminal intent to place the trooper in fear.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'apparent ability' doctrine for assault cases in Vermont, aligning the state's criminal law with the Model Penal Code's approach. It emphasizes that the focus of this type of assault is the victim's reasonable apprehension of harm, rather than the defendant's secret intent or actual capacity to cause injury. The ruling reinforces that the defendant's external conduct and its effect on a reasonable observer are paramount in determining criminal intent. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to escape liability by later proving their weapon was inoperable or that they did not truly intend to cause harm, so long as their actions created a reasonable fear in the victim.
