State v. Richie
2012 WL 1994934, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 747, 376 S.W.3d 58 (2012)
Rule of Law:
A person does not 'knowingly enter unlawfully' for the purpose of first-degree trespass when entering premises 'open to the public' through an unlocked door, unless explicitly told not to enter or remain by an authorized person. However, a person commits resisting lawful detention by fleeing from an officer making an investigatory stop, even if the underlying reason for the stop is not a proven crime, as long as the officer had a lawful basis to detain.
Facts:
- David McCombs worked as an attendant at a parking garage located at 707 Pine Street.
- The parking garage had a sign outside indicating it was 'open to the public,' and its front door entrance was unlocked.
- McCombs observed Kenneth Richie sprinting up the steps into the garage around 8 or 8:30 p.m.
- After about ten minutes, McCombs did not see Richie leave, which he found unusual, so he called the police.
- Officer Gregory Frost responded to McCombs's call, located Richie in the garage, and spotted him matching the description provided by McCombs.
- Officer Frost asked Richie what he was doing, grabbed his arm, and escorted him to sit down near the elevators to speak with him.
- Richie 'took off' toward a staircase and went down a level when Officer Frost started to speak.
- Richie was found about five minutes later hiding on the ground under a car and was arrested.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Missouri charged Kenneth J. Richie with one count of first-degree trespass (class B misdemeanor) and one count of resisting a lawful detention (class A misdemeanor).
- A jury trial was held in the trial court.
- At the close of the State's evidence, Kenneth J. Richie filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which was denied.
- At the close of all evidence, Kenneth J. Richie's motion for judgment of acquittal was again denied.
- During the instruction conference, Kenneth J. Richie objected to jury instruction No. 6 (the verdict director for resisting a lawful detention), arguing the basis for detention was trespass, but the trial court overruled the objection.
- The jury found Kenneth J. Richie guilty of both counts.
- Kenneth J. Richie filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, which was overruled by the trial court.
- The trial court sentenced Kenneth J. Richie as a prior offender to concurrent terms of six months for first-degree trespass and six months for resisting a lawful detention.
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Issue:
1. Does a person 'knowingly enter unlawfully' upon real property, as required for first-degree trespass, when they enter an unlocked parking garage advertised as 'open to the public' without explicit prohibition? 2. Was there sufficient evidence to prove resisting a lawful detention when an individual fled from a uniformed officer who was conducting an investigatory stop based on a report of suspicious activity? 3. Did the trial court err by instructing the jury on the specific factual basis for a lawful detention rather than broadly stating 'trespassing' as the basis?
Opinions:
Majority - Roy L. Richter
1. No, the State did not prove that Kenneth Richie 'knowingly entered unlawfully' the parking garage for the purpose of first-degree trespass. The court reasoned that under Section 569.140.1, first-degree trespass occurs when a person 'knowingly enters unlawfully' or 'knowingly remains unlawfully.' A person 'enters unlawfully' if not licensed or privileged. However, Section 569.010(8) states that a person entering premises 'open to the public' does so with license and privilege unless they defy a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated by the owner or authorized person. The evidence showed the parking garage was 'open to the public,' Richie entered through an unlocked public door, and there was no evidence that the attendant told him he was unwelcome or that entry was restricted without paying to park a vehicle. The State charged Richie with 'knowingly entered unlawfully,' not 'unlawfully remained,' and therefore failed to meet the burden of proof for the specific act charged. 2. Yes, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Kenneth Richie committed resisting a lawful detention. The court referenced Section 575.150.4, which explicitly states that it is no defense to resisting detention that the law enforcement officer was acting unlawfully in making the arrest or detention. Citing State v. Williams, the court reaffirmed that it is not necessary for the State to prove a defendant was being detained for a particular crime; an investigatory stop for suspicious activity is sufficient. Here, Officer Frost, a uniformed officer, was investigating suspicious activity reported by the garage attendant. Richie reasonably should have known that Officer Frost was attempting a lawful detention when Frost grabbed his arm, and Richie's act of fleeing from the officer constituted resisting that detention. 3. No, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on Count II for resisting a lawful detention. The court noted that MAI-CR 3d 329.61, Notes On Use 2, specifies that 'the court determines the question of law as to whether the facts being submitted in paragraph Fourth constitute a lawful basis for the stop or detention.' The instruction properly described the specific suspicious activity that led to the call to the police and the subsequent investigatory stop, allowing the court to make the legal determination of a lawful basis for detention, rather than having the instruction broadly state 'trespassing,' which would have improperly presented a legal conclusion to the jury instead of factual predicates.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the specific intent required for first-degree trespass, particularly when public access to property is involved. It establishes that merely entering a publicly accessible area without a clear, communicated prohibition does not automatically constitute 'unlawful entry' for trespass purposes, emphasizing the distinction between 'entering unlawfully' and 'remaining unlawfully'. Furthermore, the case reinforces the principle that resisting a police officer's lawful detention is a distinct offense, and the defendant cannot claim the detention was unlawful as a defense to resisting it, especially in the context of investigatory stops for suspicious behavior. This highlights the importance of precise charging by the State and proper adherence to jury instruction guidelines.
