State v. Renneberg
522 P.2d 835, 83 Wash. 2d 735, 1974 Wash. LEXIS 954 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
When a criminal defendant voluntarily introduces evidence of their own good character, the prosecution is permitted to rebut that evidence by cross-examining the defendant about specific acts of prior misconduct, including drug addiction, that are unrelated to the crime charged.
Facts:
- Virginia Sue LaVanway had previously been employed by a restaurant but was discharged.
- On June 24, 1970, Virginia and Milton V. LaVanway visited the restaurant so she could obtain her final paycheck.
- After going to the restrooms, Virginia returned to the front and used a telephone located next to the cash register.
- While Virginia was at the telephone, Milton paced back and forth near the restaurant's front door.
- An employee heard the cash register bell, went to investigate, and saw Virginia facing the register just before she and Milton left.
- A witness reported seeing a young woman at the register with a stack of bills in her hand.
- An immediate tally of the cash register revealed a shortage of approximately $250.
Procedural Posture:
- Virginia Sue LaVanway was charged with grand larceny and Milton V. LaVanway was charged with aiding and abetting grand larceny in the trial court.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted both defendants as charged.
- The defendants (appellants) appealed their convictions to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgments of conviction.
- The Supreme Court of Washington granted the defendants' petition for review.
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Issue:
Does the introduction of a defendant's prior drug addiction as evidence violate their right to a fair trial when the defendant has first put their good character into evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Brachtenbagh, J.
No. The introduction of the defendant's prior drug addiction was permissible because the defendant first put her good character into evidence. While evidence of drug addiction is generally too prejudicial to be admitted merely to attack a witness's general credibility, it becomes admissible for character impeachment once a defendant 'opens the door' by presenting a one-sided picture of their good character. Here, Virginia LaVanway testified about her positive life experiences, including attending college, being a pageant candidate, and participating in school clubs. This implicitly painted a picture of a person unlikely to commit larceny. The State was therefore entitled to 'complete the tapestry' by introducing the rebuttal evidence of her drug use. The court also found the jury instruction on aiding and abetting was sufficient, as its language implicitly required the finding of an overt act.
Dissenting - Finley, J.
Yes. The admission of evidence regarding prior drug use was unduly prejudicial and constituted reversible error. The majority's distinction between attacking credibility and impeaching moral character is unrealistic, as all character evidence is ultimately aimed at credibility. Lacking a scientific link between drug use and mendacity, such evidence serves only as 'character assassination' by appealing to social prejudice. The evidence of good character offered by the defendants was minimal and should not have triggered the admission of such highly prejudicial information. Furthermore, the trial court erred in refusing the defendant's proposed jury instruction on aiding and abetting, which would have properly clarified that mere presence and assent are insufficient and that an overt act is required.
Concurring - Hale, C.J.
No. While I agree with the outcome, the majority's reasoning is flawed because it needlessly limits the prior rule from Lankford v. Tombari. Evidence of drug addiction should always be admissible as a matter of law to challenge a witness's credibility, leaving the jury to determine its weight. Requiring expert testimony to prove a link between addiction and veracity in each case would create a confusing and inefficient 'collateral trial' on a medical issue. The court should have simply affirmed based on existing precedent that drug addiction is relevant to credibility, without discussing future limitations on that rule.
Analysis:
This case refines the rules of evidence in Washington concerning prior bad acts, specifically drug use. It narrows the older, broader rule that allowed drug addiction evidence to attack general credibility, holding that its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value absent scientific proof of a link to untruthfulness. However, the decision establishes a crucial exception: if a defendant opens the door by presenting positive character evidence, the prosecution may use evidence of drug addiction to rebut it. This holding creates a significant strategic consideration for defense counsel, as introducing any evidence of good character now carries the risk of opening the defendant up to cross-examination on highly prejudicial topics.
