State v. Q.D.
102 Wash. 2d 19, 1984 Wash. LEXIS 1681, 685 P.2d 557 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The statutory presumption that children aged eight to twelve are incapable of committing a crime applies in juvenile court proceedings. To rebut this presumption, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child had the capacity to understand the act and to know that it was wrong.
Facts:
- Appellant Q.D., who was 11.5 years old, was seen on school grounds playing with keys that resembled a set belonging to the night custodian.
- A custodial engineer later found that his keys, including a burglar alarm key, were missing from his unlocked office.
- The engineer could not be certain when he had last seen the keys that morning.
- Q.D. was brought into the principal's office, and after he stood up, the missing burglar alarm key was discovered on a radiator behind the chair he had been sitting in.
- Appellant M.S., who was less than three months from her 12th birthday, was babysitting a 4.5-year-old child.
- While she and the victim were alone, M.S. committed an act of indecent liberties against the child.
- After the act, M.S. threatened the victim not to tell anyone what had happened.
Procedural Posture:
- Two separate juvenile adjudications were held in a Washington state trial court (juvenile court).
- In a pretrial hearing, a judge found appellant Q.D. to have the capacity to commit a crime.
- At a subsequent trial, a different judge found Q.D. had committed trespass in the first degree.
- In a single proceeding, a trial judge found appellant M.S. to have capacity and to have committed indecent liberties, imposing a $50 penalty.
- Both Q.D. and M.S. appealed their adjudications to the Washington Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals consolidated the two appeals and certified the central legal questions to the Supreme Court of Washington for review.
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Issue:
Does the statutory presumption of infant incapacity apply to juvenile court proceedings, and if so, must the State rebut this presumption with proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
Opinions:
Majority - Dimmick, J.
No, while the statutory presumption of infant incapacity applies to juvenile proceedings, the State is not required to rebut it with proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the proper standard is clear and convincing evidence. As the juvenile justice system has evolved to become more akin to adult criminal proceedings, fundamental criminal defenses like the infancy defense must apply. Not applying the statute would render it meaningless, as juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over children in this age range. However, capacity is not an element of the crime itself, so proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. The clear and convincing standard appropriately balances the juvenile's liberty interest with the State's legitimate interests, requiring a greater burden than a mere preponderance of the evidence without being unnecessarily duplicative of the standard for proving the mental element of the offense.
Analysis:
This decision formally integrates the common law infancy defense into Washington's modern juvenile justice system, which had shifted from a purely rehabilitative model to one involving punishment. By establishing 'clear and convincing evidence' as the standard of proof to rebut the presumption of incapacity, the court created an intermediate standard that is higher than the civil preponderance standard but lower than the criminal 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard used for the elements of the crime. This precedent establishes a significant procedural hurdle for the prosecution in cases involving juveniles between 8 and 12, requiring them to affirmatively prove the child's culpable mental state before proceeding to the merits of the alleged offense. The ruling impacts future juvenile cases by requiring a distinct determination of capacity, separate from the elements of the crime itself.
